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Abstract: The United States, in its administration of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 effectively 
exported pre-existing ideas about the inferiority of non-white peoples to the island 
republic.  The American occupation failed to create a functional democratic republic 
because the administrators focused upon material and infrastructure improvements while 
not implementing social, civic, and institutional changes conducive to democracy.  The 
intervention was prompted by financial motivations and fear of a German takeover of 
Haiti, but the protracted military occupation and administration of the island quickly 
grew into a colonization project never fully supported by either the Haitian or American 
ruling classes and vociferously resisted by the Haitian commoners.  Once Haiti was under 
American control, the Marines engaged in five years of guerrilla warfare against the 
cacos, or bandit-soldiers.  News of war crimes committed by the Marines prompted an 
inquiry by the United States Senate which resulted in the appointment of Marine Corps 
Commandant John Russell as High Commissioner.  The 1920s saw the High 
Commissioner act as a military dictator, ruling through the Haitian president as a client 
and only answering to the American Secretary of State.  The Commissioner focused upon 
physical infrastructure improvement and an educational system focused upon vocational 
training and manual labor rather than the liberal-arts curriculum favored by the Haitian 
ruling class.  The educational system was not designed for a nation prepared for self-
government but a nation being groomed for perpetual dependency upon the United 
States.  The educational system imposed by the United States led to nationwide riots and 
a massacre of protesters by Marines in Aux Cayes in 1929.  The shock and scandal of the 
violence led the U.S. President to appoint a commission led by Cameron Forbes to 
organize the withdrawal of the United States and R.R. Moton to oversee the 
reorganization of the Haitian education system.  Upon withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1934, 
Haiti was left with no significant lasting institutions except the Haitian gendarmerie, 
which furnished the power base for the post-Occupation dictatorships.  Haiti remains an 
unstable country in the twenty-first century, dependent upon foreign aid for survival.  The 
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 In 1929, the Caribbean nation of Haiti was in the midst of a crisis.  The nation had spent 
fourteen years in the grips of a foreign occupation, enduring violent suppression of resistance, 
rule by military fiat, and economic exploitation and stagnation, and was about to reach a violent 
flash-point.  Students of the Haitian Service Technique began a non-violent strike against the 
educational system which expanded into general protests and riots against the Occupation.  As the 
situation deteriorated and the Haitian people continued to rise and resist against the foreigners, 
the military resorted to violent methods.  Martial law and curfews were declared, airplanes 
dropped bombs into the harbor of Aux Cayes, and Marines opened fire on protesters.1  This 
massacre would prove to be the beginning of the end of the Occupation, but reflected everything 
wrong with it at the same time.   
 The American occupiers set out on a wide-scale nation-building exercise in Haiti, 
primarily focused on the reconstruction of vital infrastructure such as roads, telegraph lines, and 
hospitals, but they devoted almost no resources to constructing a democratic, liberal society.  The 
United States built empty monuments to independence and good government, but its racial 
myopia prevented the construction of a society which mirrored those values.  Rather, the racially- 
                                                            
1 “Rushing Marines to Haiti, Hoover to Tell Congress of Troubles There,” The New York Times, 
December 7, 1929, 1. 
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motivated violence endemic to the United States followed the Marines across the sea and was 
unleashed in Haiti.  Rather than becoming, in the words of famous Marine Smedley Butler, a 
“first-class black man’s country,” Haiti remains desperately poor and unstable in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century.2 
 The essential questions raised by this study are:  What were the primary motivations 
behind the intervention in Haiti?  Why did the occupation fail to produce a stable, democratic 
nation?  To what extent, if any, did the condition of race relations in the United States inform the 
conduct of the occupiers and the course of the occupation?  The answers to these questions lie not 
in Haiti, but in the United States and its culture of white supremacy.  The occupation of Haiti 
from 1915-1934 illustrates the essence of U.S. imperialism, built on a culture of exploitation, 
phony democracy, and paternalistic racism.  To understand the U.S. occupation of Haiti is to 
understand U.S.-Caribbean relations in the twentieth century and the American culture of 
imperialism in the early twentieth century.   
The Haitian experiment was a test of Wilsonian Internationalism, the policy ideals of 
President Woodrow Wilson, which determined to use American influence to spread liberalism 
and democracy abroad.  In practice Wilsonian idealism did little to spread democracy and 
furthered only the economic and political interests of the United States.  The United States 
inherited the remnants of the Spanish colonial empire in 1898, and the years of Wilson’s 
presidency saw an increased vigor for interventionism on the American periphery.  This 
interventionism came hand-in-hand with Progressive-era ideas about paternalism, eugenics, and 
Social Darwinism.  Republics such as Haiti, peopled almost entirely by Africans, were squarely at 
the bottom of the racial hierarchy. 
                                                            




Robert Lansing, U.S. Secretary of State during the invasion, denounced the black race as 
incapable of self-government entirely.  “The African race is devoid of any capacity for political 
organization and lack genius for government.  Unquestionably there is in them an inherent 
tendency to revert to savagery and cast aside the shackles of civilization which are irksome to 
their physical nature.”3  Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips blamed political instability 
in Haiti on “the failure of an inferior people to maintain the degree of civilization left them by the 
French, or to develop any capacity of self-government entitling them to international respect or 
confidence.”4 
 The chauvinism displayed by these diplomats was egregious, but unsurprising.  When the 
Marines disembarked in Port-au-Prince in 1915, slavery was still in living memory (only fifty 
years had passed since the end of the Civil War).  Millions of black Americans were denied basic 
constitutional rights by the system of white supremacy commonly called Jim Crow, which would 
not begin to be dismantled for another four decades.  When the Marines took control of Haiti, 
they effectively exported the Jim Crow system to the island republic.  In the words of The Crisis, 
publishing organ of the American National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), “If the ‘civilization’ is to be of the Georgia type may the good Lord deliver Hayti (sic) 
from it!”5 
 
                                                            
3 Robert Lansing to J.H. Oliver, RADM, USN, governor of Virgin Islands, January 30, 1918; Library of 
Congress, Papers of Robert Lansing, quoted in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 
1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 63. 
4 William Phillips, “Notes and Recommendations on the Political Situation in Haiti,” August 1915, 
quoted in Schmidt, 63. 
5 DuBois, W.E.B., ed., “Hayti,” The Crisis (October, 1915), 281. 
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Haitian-U.S. Relations: 1800-1915 
 Since the nineteenth century, the United States viewed the Caribbean as its sphere of 
influence.  While it did not engage in direct colonization of the Caribbean during the century, it 
zealously opposed European intervention and colonialism.  The United States most eloquently 
stated these principles in the Monroe Doctrine.  This doctrine, drafted by John Quincy Adams and 
announced by President James Monroe in 1823, denounced European colonialism and asserted 
the rights of the United States to intervene to prevent colonialism.  “The American continents, by 
the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to 
be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”6  The Monroe 
Doctrine established the foundations of interventionist anti-colonialism.  U.S. imperialism was 
inherently one-sided, concerned with American economic interests to the detriment of the native 
population.  Social Darwinism of the Progressive Era instilled an ideology of paternalistic racism 
into U.S. interventionist policies.  The Haitian experience mirrored the experience of Cubans, 
Dominicans, and others who fell under the shadow of American hegemony.7 
 Throughout its history, Haiti occupied an important position in the economic interests of 
the United States.  Haiti occupies the western third of the island Hispaniola and forms the eastern 
portion of the Windward Passage.  This passage is the only direct route between the eastern 
United States and the Panama Canal.  The island nation is only six hundred miles off the coast of 
Florida, making it strategically important to United States shipping and naval strategy in the 
Caribbean.  Its rich agricultural sector included coffee, cotton, cacao, tobacco, indigo, and sugar 
plantations.   
                                                            
6 James Monroe, “Monroe Doctrine,” Address to Congress, U.S. Congress, December 2, 1823. 
7 Anthony P. Maingot and Wilfredo Lozano, The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming 
Hegemony and Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1. 
5 
 
 As early as 1686, the French colony of Saint Domingue began trading with the English 
colonies on the eastern coast of North America.  In 1717, the government of France authorized 
exchange of molasses from Saint Domingue for fish from New England.  This molasses reached 
Massachusetts distilleries and smugglers brought it back to Saint Domingue as rum.  This illicit 
trade between the British and French colonies continued despite the Molasses Act of 1733 and the 
Seven Years War between Britain and France.  French defeat in the war led the French 
government to allow British ships limited free trade rights in the Dominican port of Môle St. 
Nicolas.  The trade between two colonies of rival imperial powers contradicted prevailing 
mercantilist economic theories of the day and emphasized the growing interdependence of the 
Caribbean islands with the North American mainland.8   
 The trade restrictions imposed by the British Parliament to quash the free exchange 
between its colonies and French colonies contributed significantly to American grievances 
against Britain before the American Revolution of the 1770s.  Indeed, French desire to preserve 
trade with the colonies and prevent a British attack on Saint Domingue likely contributed to the 
Franco-American alliance of 1778.9  Article XI of the Treaty of Alliance bound the United States 
to the military defense of the French West Indies as well as any other French possessions in the 
western hemisphere.10  The Treaty of Paris secured American independence in 1783, and France 
followed with a revolution of its own in 1789. 
 The turmoil in Europe following the fall of the Bourbon dynasty weakened French 
control over its overseas colonies.  The United States abandoned the Franco-American alliance by 
                                                            
8 Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891, (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 6. 
9 Logan, The Diplomatic History of the United States with Haiti, 7-8. 
10 Richard Peters, ed., “Treaty of Alliance with France, 1778,” The Public Statutes at Large of the United 
States of America, vol. 8 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1867), 10. 
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proclaiming neutrality in the French Revolutionary Wars of 1793, and unilaterally abrogated the 
treaty in 1798.11  France was left with no allies in North America as its colonial empire crumbled.  
The French Revolution inspired the free black people of Saint Domingue to demand more rights 
from the colonial government, followed by a large-scale slave revolt in 1791.  Touissant 
L’Overture, the military leader of the revolt, aligned himself with the French Revolutionary 
government in 1794 once France abolished slavery.  In 1801, he drafted a constitution 
proclaiming autonomy and made himself governor.  Saint Domingue still owed nominal 
allegiance to France, but the government in Paris held no actual control over the nascent black 
republic.  L’Overture actively sought support for his cause from both Britain and the United 
States.  
 However, by 1801, France sought to re-assert control over its colony.  Numerous French 
victories under Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe strengthened French resolve and restored hopes of 
a French colonial empire in the Americas.  In 1802-3, the revolutionaries defeated a French 
contingent led by Captain-General Charles Leclerc, the brother-in-law of Napoleon Bonaparte.  
As France retreated, the colony declared its independence on January 1, 1804.  The revolutionary 
leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines renamed the republic Haiti, an aboriginal word meaning “land of 
the mountains.”12  The population of the new republic was over 90 percent black, and descended 
from slaves.  The revolutionary government drafted a constitution forbidding whites from owning 
land in Haiti.  This policy, as well as the violence suffered under the revolutionaries, caused the 
                                                            
11 “Milestones: 1784-1800,” U.S. Department of State, retrieved January 14, 2015, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/xyz. 
12 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1971), 19. 
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French plantation owners to flee to the United States, where many of them settled in South 
Carolina.13 
The United States’ Southern, land-holding aristocracy balked at the Haitian Revolution.  
Despite the Declaration of Independence declaring that “all men are created equal,” the majority 
of the United States’ black population lived in slavery., and it was the largest slave-holding nation 
in the world; of its population of 5.3 million, 900,000 people were slaves.  Slaveholders in the 
South feared that the Haitian revolution would encourage similar revolts among their slaves.  At 
the same time L’Overture won his victories against France, authorities in Virginia uncovered a 
slave rebellion led by Gabriel Prosser.  The prospect of violent rebellion frightened United States 
President Jefferson, who declared “if something is not done, and soon done, we shall be the 
murderers of our own children.”14  To Jefferson, the Haitian revolution exacerbated the looming 
threat of servile insurrection already present in the slave society of the South.  He saw nothing but 
violence and bloodshed in the future if the rebellion succeeded.  Jefferson opposed Haiti because 
he believed that blacks would transform the island into a rogue state, and because he feared the 
loss of French hegemony in the Caribbean, which he viewed as favorable to U.S. interests. 
As the Leclerc expedition neared Saint Domingue, Jefferson shifted his policies to 
oppose France.  He learned of French plans to occupy New Orleans after quashing the rebellion.  
French control of Louisiana would disrupt American shipping on the Mississippi River.  
Furthermore, he feared the French might attempt to pacify the island by deporting the rebels to 
North America.  He suspected the French would use slave insurrection as a tool to undermine the 
                                                            
13 Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States, 1714-1958 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1958), 9. 
14 Tim Matthewson, “Jefferson and Haiti,” The Journal of Southern History 61 (May 1995): 219. 
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United States as they had used it against the British in the 1790s.15  The president publicly 
announced U.S. neutrality, but in practice traded with the rebels.  Ultimately, the Leclerc 
expedition failed without crucial U.S. support.  Leclerc died of yellow fever in 1802 and the 
expedition fell apart by late 1803.  After this failure, Napoleon abandoned his designs on a North 
American empire.  He sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803.16   
Jefferson could not disavow the Haitian revolution entirely, because he opposed slavery 
on moral grounds and supported gradual emancipation.  Nevertheless, his fears of insurrection 
and desire to establish U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean prevented the United States from 
extending diplomatic recognition to Haiti.  The United States did not recognize Haitian 
independence until 1862, after the slave-holding states seceded from the Union.17  Even in the 
early nineteenth century, the first glimpses of the often acrimonious relationship between the two 
republics emerged. 
The black republic began its independence isolated from the rest of the world.  France, 
though defeated by the revolutionaries, forced the Haitian government to pay a large indemnity to 
guarantee the nation’s independence.  Unlike the United States, it did not have a tradition of self-
government and democracy.  Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the hero of independence, solidified his 
power by massacring whites who survived the war of independence.  He abandoned 
republicanism entirely and declared himself emperor Jacques I.  Haiti’s diplomatic and economic 
isolation bred a culture of militarism and autocracy.  Constant threats of invasion from France 
necessitated a strong military, and the loss of French colonial authority meant the loss of civilian 
                                                            
15 Matthewson, “Jefferson and Haiti,” 223. 
16 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 28. 
17 Montague, 86. 
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government entirely.18  Haiti spent most of the century in flux, as the presidency shifted between 
strong-men.  From 1908-1915, the six different men held the presidency.  This “revolutionary 
cycle” reinforced a paternalistic racist sentiment among the U.S. occupiers:  Because Haiti lacked 
stable government, the United States needed to provide it. 
Haitian Society and Culture 
 The social order of Haiti consisted of two large groups: the former colonial exploiters and 
the large mass of former slaves.  The former were affranchis, or gens de coleur, mixed-race 
descendants of French colonials.  The colonial racial hierarchy afforded the affranchis a 
privileged position in society, and many of them lived on plantations in the style of the grands 
blancs.  They were educated and wealthy, spoke French, and practiced Catholicism.   Haitian 
affranchis hoped to achieve international prestige and recognition by emulating French language, 
mannerisms, and culture.  The Haitian ruling class was educated a French-model classical liberal-
arts curriculum which emphasized rhetoric, literature, history, and Latin.  These elites despised 
anything africain and identified themselves with French culture.19  The affranchis were largely 
split in their attitude towards the foreign Occupation.  The 1915 intervention came at a time in 
which the gens de coleur were close to losing their monopoly on political power, and the client-
presidents selected by the Occupation to lead the country, Dartiguenave and Borno, were 
members of the mixed-race ruling class themselves.   
 The africains descended from African-born slaves who still held to the culture of their 
ancestors.  They spoke Haitian Creole, a language based on Norman French but incorporating 
elements from West African languages.  They practiced vodoun, a syncretic religion which blends 
                                                            
18 Ibid., 13-14. 
19 Montague, 11-12. 
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Catholicism with traditional West African religious practices.  During the Occupation, the 
africains were largely opposed to foreign control and resented the elites for tolerating it.  During 
the guerrilla campaign, africain soldiers wore charms and amulets believed in vodoun to ward off 
enemy bullets.  The peasant-soldier’s belief in vodoun was so strong and vital to the anti-U.S. 
resistance that the Marines, allied with the French and affranchi clergy, attempted unsuccessfully 
to ban the practice of vodoun.20  Most africains were illiterate, and left little surviving records 
beyond what the occupying Marines or the ruling class wrote about them.   
Haitian Finances 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, Haiti remained in the French sphere of influence, and 
the ruling class expressed Francophilic sentiments. Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century 
French influence in the western hemisphere declined.  A rivalry between the United States and 
Germany for Haitian influence dominated Haitian history in the first decade of the century.21 
 German merchants circumvented the constitutional prohibition on white landownership 
by intermarrying with prominent affranchi families.  German merchants intermingled freely with 
Haitian elites, unlike U.S. businessmen whose racial prejudices prevented them from stooping so 
low.  The creation of this Germano-Haitian class greatly increased German influence over the 
Haitian economy.  By 1914, the U.S. State department estimated that Germany controlled 80 
percent of commercial businesses, as well as all public utilities in Port-au-Prince and Cap-
Haïtien.22  The previous year, war erupted in Europe and Germany had become a potential 
enemy.  Though the United States remained neutral, German interest in Haiti became a larger 
                                                            
20 Schmidt, 23. 
21 Schmidt, 34. 
22 Ibid., 35.  
11 
 
threat to U.S. security.  If Germany took Haiti, the U.S. would lose control over the Windward 
Passage and quick access to the Panama Canal.  Germany’s Haitian designs likewise violated the 
U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean.  To subvert German gains, U.S. businessmen such as James P. 
McDonald used bribery to secure concessions to build a National Railroad.23  Though 
McDonald’s railroad never saw completion, the concession served as an important pretense for 
intervention in 1915.24   
 The poor state of Haitian finances provided an opening for foreign powers.  In 1910, the 
Haitian economy hurtled toward bankruptcy while rebellions broke out in the north, and Haitians 
looked to foreign investors to revitalize their economy and infrastructure.  In 1905, the Haitian 
government suspended the treasury service offered by the French-controlled Banque National.  
Its re-structuring and reorganization led to a power struggle between Franco-German and U.S.-
backed investment firms.  The Franco-German investors secured a contract for a 65 million franc 
loan to Haiti.  The Banque held the sole right to issue paper money and acted as the government 
treasury.25  Due to objections from the U.S. State Department, the Franco-German controllers of 
the bank conceded to 50 percent American ownership of the Banque.26  Article XXIII of the 
contract prohibited diplomatic intervention by U.S.  By 1911, Americans replaced Frenchmen as 
the primary bank directors, leading to virtual U.S. control over the Banque. 27  American control 
over the finances and infrastructure of the island republic enabled the United States to intervene 
in the following years.  However, the United States’ foreign policy had evolved over the 
                                                            
23 Montague, 202. 
24 Schmidt, 37-38. 
25 Ibid., 39. 
26 Montague, 201. 
27 Schmidt, 40. 
12 
 
nineteenth century to justify intervention on humanitarian and moralistic grounds to obfuscate the 
true, venal motivation of the invasion. 
 After American Marines disembarked in Port-au-Prince, Haiti was not formally part of 
the American colonial empire, but nevertheless the United States administered the island as a 
colony.  The racial prejudices of the United States influenced the Occupation administration to 
run the republic as if it were an American state under the Jim Crow system.  The education 
system imposed upon Haiti had as its antecedent the Tuskegee Institute’s vocational training, 
designed for agricultural and technical education at the expense of the liberal arts.  This system 
focused to create a permanent underclass of black laborers presided over by white administrators, 
which mirrored the sociopolitical situation in the American South.   
 In the South, just as in Haiti, the white American ruling class used racism to justify the 
subjugation of black people.  The Progressive era brought scientific racism along with 
paternalism, the complex socio-cultural belief in limiting the agency of subjugated peoples to 
eventually allow their autonomy following a period of “white tutelage.”  While this idea led to the 
independence of the Philippines and the assimilation of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, it did nothing for 
Haiti.  The United States, instead of ruling with a light hand and preparing the island for self-
government, centralized the administration under the High Commissioner and eliminated any 
democratic participation in the government.  The financial backers of the Occupation, beginning 
with a major loan in 1922, imposed a regime of foreign aid upon Haiti, deepening ties between 
Haiti and the United States, but also ensuring the compliance of Haiti’s government through 
dependency upon foreign aid. 
 Study of Haiti in the context of contemporary U.S. race relations reveals an island both 
unique and typical.  Haiti was typical of the colonized territories acquired after 1898, which were 
all primarily populated by non-white peoples and all had some form of colonialist “uplift” 
13 
 
program applied to their health, education, and infrastructure system.  However, Haiti was not 
interchangeable with the Philippines, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii.  The Haitian people were African, 
and their republic was forged in a crucible of servile insurrection.  The chaotic state of Haiti in 
1915 allowed white supremacists and imperialists to point to the perceived futility of self-rule for 
the black republic.  Thus, while the uplift programs of education, health, and infrastructure 
improvement were allowed in varying degrees to succeed in those colonies destined for self-rule 
or assimilation, Haiti remained permanently in the American periphery. 
 The intersection between the foreign and domestic is a recurring theme in the study of 
Haiti and the United States.  The failure of the American Occupation to create a functional state 
with democratic institutions was the result of shifts in the United States’ foreign policy over two 
decades.    The domestic reaction to the scandal of war crimes committed by the Marines led to 
public hearings in the U.S. Senate and the creation of the office of High Commissioner.  This 
marked an isolationist turn in foreign policy, with the administration of Haiti becoming a purely 
internal affair in the State Department.  The drafting of the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe 
Doctrine foreshadowed the beginning of the Good Neighbor Policy later fully implemented in the 
1930s under Franklin Roosevelt.   
 Haiti from 1915-1934 was the beginning of Haiti’s history as a periphery of the United 
States, a position it occupies in the twenty-first century.  While the Occupation failed in its 
nation-building, it maintained United States influence over the island, which secured American 
financial interests, prevented European control of the Windward Passage, and during the Cold 
War secured Haiti as a counter-weight to Cuba.  The African-American press viewed Haiti as a 
proxy for their own struggles at home.  The experiment with nation-building provided a template 
for other experiments in empire, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The primary reason for 









 The United States’ 1915 invasion of the Caribbean republic of Haiti and subsequent 19-
year occupation of the island illustrates the complex relationship between the United States and 
its Latin American neighbors as well as the profound effect domestic policy concerning race had 
upon foreign policy.   
 The historiographical conversation about the occupation of Haiti is divided into three 
schools: the imperialist school, the isolationist school, and the post-colonialist school.  Essential 
questions answered by all three schools include: what was the primary motivation behind the U.S. 
invasion, was the occupation’s failure due to American or Haitian deficiencies, and to what 
extent, if any, did the race relations issue in the United States influence the conduct of the 
occupiers? 
Contemporary Accounts 
 Journalists and scholars began writing analyses of the Haitian occupation, its motivations, 
and its goals almost as soon as the Marines disembarked in 1915.  The divide in opinion on U.S. 
policy in the Caribbean almost perfectly mirrored the color divide in larger American society.  In 
the mainstream (white) press, the dominant view of Haiti before 1915 and up to the invasion was 




 In 1908, U.S. Admiral Colby Chester characterized Haiti as a “degenerating island” when 
he profiled the country for National Geographic in 1908.  He described the Haitians (and 
neighboring Dominicans) as “[disposed] to laziness and vice,” and described the Haitian people 
as having a “general tendency to revolution” while “degenerating to a condition of barbarism.”28  
This, according to Chester, was due in large part to “the white element having been practically 
exterminated or removed from the island.”29  Chester likewise considered the “pest-hole” of Haiti 
unsuited for self-government without the tutelage of the United States.  “We owe it to ourselves,” 
he wrote, “to help them over the many pitfalls of popular government, which we by example led 
them to establish before they had gone through the preparation necessary for the proper use of 
universal suffrage.”30 
 The American press took a dim view of Haitian prospects for self-government during the 
1915 intervention.  The Richmond Times-Dispatch described Haiti as “the only country in the 
world where a white man cannot own land just because he is white,” and  
“heavenly by nature though a h—l spot by the wishes of its inhabitants […] The indolent 
blacks have suffered the fine buildings of the French cities to fall into ruins and live in most 
miserable shacks.  The streets and the sewers are identical[…]Vessels for the Panama 
Canal from New York will most likely skirt its coast, giving it the chance for great 
development—a future which it will surely miss unless some outside hand holds down the 
wild fighting blacks.”31   
The Caldwell Watchman from Columbia, Louisiana, called the history of Haiti “a story of 
misery.  The characters are childish Negroes, who play at dignity, spill blood, and do no work.  In 
natural advantages, Haiti is a land of fertile opulence, but what is human there is based and 
                                                            
28 Colby Chester, “Haiti: A Degenerating Island,” National Geographic XIX (March 1908), 206-215. 
29 Ibid., 214. 
30 Ibid., 217. 




wretched.”32  The Salt Lake City Broad Ax characterized the invasion as “[an end] to more than a 
century of misrule, anarchy, and murder.”33   
 The reaction and coverage of the Haitian policy was quite different in the black press, 
which was largely sympathetic to the Haitians.  Two editorials in the November 1915 edition of 
The Crisis commented negatively on the arbitrary use of force in the Caribbean.  The first, signed 
simply “J.C.,” is ironically titled, “Haitians and Other Savages,” and compared the lurid pictures 
of mob violence from Port-au-Prince with the lynch mobs across the American South.   
“Whatever may be the solution of Haiti's difficulties, it is certain that the people will not 
give their support to a government which even thinks of selling the Haitian's birthright of 
liberty, licentious as it may be, for the promise of a mess of American pottage […] But if 
they must accept enforced subjection to some foreign power, rather than submit to a 
nation controlled by a press which remains callous in the presence of horrors in Texas 
and Georgia while vociferously condemning German atrocities and Haitian savagery, the 
Haitians would sooner trust to the tender mercies of Count Reventlow, the Kaiser, and 
Kultur.” 34   
 Likewise, in an open letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, published in the same 
volume, Charles F. Dole (cousin of Sanford Dole, Hawaiian territorial governor) criticized the 
Wilson administration for continuing the imperialistic programs of the Roosevelt years and 
compared the United States unfavorably to the British Empire, accusing it of arbitrary conquest.  
He wrote, “a development is inevitable: control quickly hardens into conquest.  Does the United 
States meditate the conquest of Hayti (sic)?”35   
 In a coda to an otherwise expository article concerning U.S. plans for the occupation, the 
Baltimore Afro-American Ledger acknowledged the role of race informing policy toward Haiti.  
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“The fact that Haitians are Negroes and speak a different language makes it seem improbable that 
the United States would desire to annex them and thus have colored men in the American 
Congress.”36   
 Due to the relative stability of the country following the end of the bandit campaign, the 
1920s saw an increase in tourism to Haiti from the United States.  The perceived exoticism of the 
black republic drew writers, activists, and missionaries to its shores, where travelogues and 
memoirs proliferated.  Whether white or black, the authors of these accounts projected their own 
ideas of civilization onto the situation in Haiti, making their books useful to gauge the attitudes of 
the United States toward the Occupation. 
 Samuel Guy Inman traveled to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the 
summer of 1919 and published his account the following year.  Inman, a Texas native and 
missionary for the Disciples of Christ denomination, would later be influential in the formation of 
the Good Neighbor Policy.  In 1915, Inman co-founded the Committee on Co-operation with 
Latin America and served as its secretary until 1939.  Beginning with his study of the United 
States’ involvement in the Mexican Revolution, Intervention in Mexico, he began comparative 
studies of each Latin American republic subject to a recent U.S. intervention. 
 In Through Haiti and Santo Domingo: A Cruise with the Marines, Inman 
presented his travelogue as a description of the island and its people, along with 
“recommendations for the development of an educational, social, and spiritual program 
that will be a real help to these two needy countries.”37  He intended his book to be a 
missionary’s guide and practical handbook while in the field.  While Inman was skeptical 
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of foreign interventionism (keeping with the pacifism in his denominational tradition), he 
fully embraced the idea of a mission civilisatrice.  
 Inman viewed Haiti as “a very dark spot on the horizon of the United States.”38  
In his estimation, the Haitian people were awash in an ocean of spiritual darkness and 
sexual immorality.  He focused specific harsh criticism toward practitioners of vodoun, 
which he associated with promiscuity and barbarism.  He wrote disdainfully of Haitain 
men, whom he described as effete and lazy, with “little regard for marriage in our sense 
of the word.”  He described rural peasants as “little above the animal” and their 
traditional dances as “scenes of unbelievable obscenity.”39   
 Throughout his travels, Inman kept his interactions with Haitians to a minimum 
while reproducing the opinions of the Marines, who were engaged in a counter-
insurgency campaign against these people.  He included lengthy sections of apologia 
excusing the conduct of the Marines, declaring “No man knows but that he might act in 
the same way under similar conditions.  It is the machine, not the man, that is to blame.”  
Nevertheless, Inman did fault the military administration for his heavy-handedness in 
dealing with the cacos, particularly the harshness of the corvée.40 
The Isolationists 
 The isolationists wrote during the 1920s and 1930s, during a period of reaction against 
Wilsonian internationalism.  The isolationists disagreed with the interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine used by Wilson to justify interventionism and criticized the Wilson administration for its 
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failures.  Writers from this school were Roosevelt Democrats or Republicans, rather than 
Wilsonian Democrats.  The isolationists differed in their emphasis on financial and racial 
motivations for the U.S. conduct during its occupation. 
 A series of four articles by James Weldon Johnson of the NAACP published in The 
Nation in 1920 reflected the contemporary African-American view of the occupation as a scheme 
by Southerners to export Jim Crow to the Caribbean.  The newspaper considered his articles 
important enough to compile his articles into a 48-page pamphlet entitled Self-Determining Haiti 
the same year.  In his introduction, Johnson refers to the invasion and occupation as a “dark blot 
[on] the American escutcheon,” and characterizes his report as an exposé designed to turn public 
opinion against the continued American presence in Haiti.41   
 Johnson believed the invasion was not motivated by a desire to restore peace after the 
violent murder of President Sam.  “To know the reasons for the present political situation in 
Haiti…it is necessary, among other things, to know that the National City Bank of New York is 
very interested in Haiti.”  Johnson documented attempts by the State Department to intervene in 
Haiti before the violent coup d’etat which the United States government used to justify its 
intervention.  “The overthrow of Guillame and its attending consequences did not constitute the 
cause of the American intervention in Haiti, but merely furnished the awaited opportunity.”42   
 Johnson decried the undemocratic methods the American military used to seize control of 
the Haitian government.  He decries martial law and military rule by the U.S. Marine Corps, and 
calls for the United States to restore democratic rule.  According to Johnson, Haiti under the 
occupation suffered censorship of the press, a sham constitution written by American bankers, 
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and violence and intimidation by the military.  “Haiti was given a new constitution by an 
unconstitutional method…All of this has been done in the name of the Government of the United 
States; however, without any act by Congress or any knowledge of the American people.”43   
 Johnson viewed the guerrilla campaign against the caco rebels as completely unjustified.  
In his articles, he argues the United States perpetuated the revolutionary cycle of violence on the 
island.  “Pacification would never have been necessary had not American policies been filled 
with so many stupid and brutal blunders; and it will never be effective so long as "pacification" 
means merely the hunting of ragged Haitians in the hills with machine guns.”44  He furthermore 
denied that Haiti had an endemic problem of revolutionary violence, and indicted machinating 
foreigners for instigating periodic revolts.  Of the revolutions, he said: “Not nearly so bloody as 
reported, their interference with people not in politics is almost negligible.  Nor should it be 
forgotten that in almost every instance the revolution is due to the plotting of foreigners backed 
up by their Governments.”45 
 Writing as a black man during the Jim Crow era, Johnson understood the racial prejudice 
behind the violence against the cacos as well as the racially-motivated inequities in the 
occupation administration.  He notes that many of the foreigners in the occupation administration 
were Democrats from the American South, enjoying the perks of political patronage while the 
native administrators enjoyed no such amenities.   
Those at Port-au-Prince live in beautiful villas.  Families that could not keep a 
hired girl in the United States have a half-dozen servants.  They ride in automobiles not 
their own.  Every American head of a department in Haiti has an automobile furnished at 
the expense of the Haitian Government, whereas members of the Haitian cabinet, who are 
theoretically above them, have no such convenience or luxury.46 
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 Johnson’s scathing polemic against the occupation may have resonated among the 
African-American community and white liberals, but mainstream academic thought did not rely 
on his report or articles for almost half a century.  Johnson occupies a unique place in the 
conversation about the American occupation of Haiti.  He wrote as a contemporary and witness to 
the events he described, and his assessment is essentially identical to historians writing at the turn 
of the twenty-first century.  Because of the limited temporal scope of his work, one cannot read 
Johnson’s pamphlet to evaluate the later years of the occupation or the policies which led to 
American withdrawal from the island. 
The Imperialists 
Works in the imperialist school were written following the American withdrawal in the 
1930s.  They were tonally apologetic and take a positive view of the influence of the United 
States during the occupation.  Imperialists view the actions of the United States as necessary to 
pacify an unruly nation and leave it with infrastructure and institutions for full independence.  In 
the context of U.S.-Latin American relations, they view the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollary as 
positives, and American hegemony in the western hemisphere as benevolent. 
 A 1942 study of the United States’ interventions in the Caribbean by Wilfrid Hardy 
Callcott exemplified the thoughts of such apologists.  Callcott served as an administrator of the 
University of South Carolina from 1923-1968, during which he wrote The Caribbean Policy of 
the United States.  The author’s experiences as a white Southerner during the early twentieth 
century inform his analysis of American foreign policy and the actions of the United States in the 
Caribbean republics.  Callcott divided the foreign policy of the United States into four distinct 




the western hemisphere47  This periodization of American imperialism and hegemony is useful to 
explain the shift in policy between the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations. 
 Callcott traced American expansionism in the twentieth century to the Monroe Doctrine 
in the early nineteenth century and the prevention of foreign monopolies in the western 
hemisphere.  By the end of the nineteenth century, “the public had begun to conceive of [the 
Caribbean] as economically and morally a United States problem since nature had placed it 
geographically adjacent to this country.”48  He coverd the Haitian intervention in the same chapter 
as the contemporaneous Dominican intervention, and in both cases he asserted “the objective was 
ultimate democracy and not permanent Yankee control.”49  Callcott presented the situation 
preceding intervention as a humanitarian crisis, and stated, “There was no serious opposition to 
[intervention] and it was agreed that the better class of Haitians were glad of what had been 
done.”50 
 Callcott’s conservative and apologetic treatment of United States imperialism hampers 
the usefulness of his work as an objective study of the Haitian occupation.  Callcott primarily 
uses State Department records and correspondence between Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan and President Wilson to analyze the motives behind the American intervention.  Later 
studies cast Bryan as essentially ignorant of the political realities of Haiti, meaning that the 
objective historian cannot use Bryan’s account uncritically, as Callcott did. 
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Future Democratic Senator Paul H. Douglas, writing two articles in Political Science 
Quarterly in 1927, recognized the occupation of Haiti as colonialism, but nevertheless justified it 
and took a largely benign, if critical, view of the colonizers.  He characterized this imperialism as 
occurring “without the knowledge or consent of the voters.”51  He characterized the Haitian 
government as an American puppet state, and the Haitian gendarmerie as staffed by non-
commissioned officers from the United States.  A U.S.-appointed financial advisor controlled the 
Haitian budget, and a corps of U.S. marines acted as the primary police force on the island.  The 
U.S. legate insisted upon review of all legislation touching upon the terms of the 1915 treaty 
legitimizing the occupation.  In practice, this gave the U.S. High Commissioner veto power over 
the Haitian government.  If Haiti was independent, it was independent in name only.52  
 Douglas emphasized the unscrupulous nature of foreign investors, such as James P. 
MacDonald, who bribed the Haitian government to secure rights to construct a railroad from Port-
au-Prince in the south to Cap-Haïtien in the north and for exclusive rights on banana cultivation 
and exportation.53  Douglas blamed this railroad concession and U.S. financial interests in its 
construction for the Occupation.  The United States had a vested interest in the completion of the 
railroad, and the political instability preceding the Occupation disrupted construction.  Likewise, 
he believed competition for control over the Haitian Banque National between U.S. and German 
interests hastened the invasion.54 
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 Douglas was not entirely critical of the occupation, especially concerning advances in 
railroad construction and improved access to medical care.  He considered the U.S. guerrilla 
campaign against the cacos, Haitian rebels, justified, and only criticized the Occupation for its 
failure to minimize civilian casualties.55  Nevertheless, he considered the colonization of Haiti as 
an affront to American ideals and advised immediate withdrawal.  He did not address the racial 
aspect of the occupation at all.  Although Douglas became an advocate for civil rights during his 
Senate career, he appeared to consider racial equality as a secondary concern in Haiti.   
Douglas criticized the occupation from a technocratic and paternalistic worldview.  He 
believed the instability of Haiti necessitated intervention, and that the United States could provide 
democratic institutions and infrastructure to allow Haiti to recover as an independent nation.  He 
did not reject the motivations of the United States for invading Haiti.  He merely denounced the 
corruption and undemocratic nature of the occupation government.  In this sense, Douglas was a 
Progressive anti-imperialist who opposed colonialism rather than interventionism. 
A 1926 article by Ulysses B. Weatherly published in the American Journal of 
Sociology defended the occupation on pragmatic grounds.  “Probably there has been no 
case of an intervention avowedly based on pure benevolence. Governments are not 
accustomed to act on motives other than those of self-interest, although they sometimes 
inject a tone of philanthropy into the language of public documents.”56   
Weatherly represented the naked paternalism of the reorganized occupation.  The 
appeals to law and order and national self determination trumpeted by the Marines and 
State Department during the invasion and guerrilla campaign disappeared.  Occupied 
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Haiti did not lack democracy because of external threats or internal insurrection, but 
simply because Haitians did not deserve democracy.  Weatherly blamed the Haitians 
because they lacked “white tutelage” like the black citizens of the United States and other 
Caribbean islands:   
As a black republic Haiti practiced for more than a century an 
aggressive isolation. The color line was drawn against the whites, and until 
quite recently aliens were not allowed to own land. This policy of 
exclusion has not even yet been voluntarily abandoned, and it is one of the 
issues in the present patriotic agitation. With the exception of a small 
group of mixed bloods, the people at the beginning of their national career 
had had no preliminary experience in either economic or political self-
direction. Political and social forms taken over outright from France and 
America were set to work among a population at once unfamiliar with 
them and notably weak in capacity for social organization of any kind.57 
 Weatherly proposed improving the roads and sanitation to enable social cohesion 
and higher quality of life.  From this improved infrastructure, civic life would naturally 
improve and democracy would emerge naturally:  “Before the people can be really free 
there must be an elaborate process of building; there must be constructed the material 
equipment through which society may function, and there must be developed the 
intelligence and the civic spirit which are absolutely essential in a democracy.”58  The 
Haitian people likewise needed a robust economy and investment of foreign capital.  
According to Weatherly’s theory, the Haitian people needed the authoritarian High 
Commissioner and foreign occupation to have a future enlightened society:  “In 1922 the 
office of High Commissioner was created[…]Then for the first time it was possible to 
initiate a systematic constructive policy.”59  Nevertheless, Weatherly argued the United 
States should integrate Haitian natives into the administration as quickly as possible to 
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prevent social decay.  The Occupation administration showed little willingness to follow 
his advice. 
 In 1940, Ludwell Lee Montague, who later gained fame for his role in the creation of the 
CIA, wrote a history of U.S.-Haitian relations spanning the years 1714-1938.  Though the scope 
of the work exceeds the occupation years, Montague believed that cultural misunderstandings and 
mutual xenophobia between the United States and Haiti caused the violence during the 
occupation.  Unlike Douglas, Lee emphasized the racial composition of Haiti and the racial 
differences between the Americans, the cacos, and the Haitian administrators.  His introduction 
emphasized the strategic importance of the Windward Passage to American naval strategy in the 
Caribbean.60  The temporal scope of his work allows for a chapter covering the attempt by the 
United States to annex Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the 1860s.  “It was not the first, nor 
yet the last, instance of an aggressive attitude cloaked, without conscious hypocrisy, in the guise 
of a mission civilisatrice.”61  The annexation schemes of the 1860s failed because of 
Congressional interference and lack of public support, but the United States still firmly believed 
both nations of Hispaniola were in its sphere of influence. 
 Montague connected the Taft Administration’s policy of “Dollar Diplomacy” with the 
Haitian Banque National.  Haitians created the bank to introduce foreign capital into the country 
and stimulate their economic development.  Like Douglas, Montague saw the railroad and bank 
as the primary reasons for U.S. intervention in 1915.  “[The Marines] would not have been 
present had there been no bank, railroad, or any other American investment in Haiti.  This action 
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was not ‘dollar diplomacy,’ but ‘international police power.’”62  Montague understood the 
financial investment enabled by Dollar Diplomacy as directly preceding armed intervention. 
 Montague presented the U.S. as an essentially rational, if hypocritical actor.  He describes 
the election of Philippe Dartiguenave under military occupation as essentially legitimate, and the 
opposition candidate Rosalvo Bobo as a dangerous revolutionary leader.  Although he conceded 
“it may be doubted whether the electors cast their ballots in any sense of freedom,” he regards the 
Dartiguenave government as a force for stability.63   
 Montague presented the people of the United States as essentially unconcerned with the 
Haitian occupation.  In regards to the scant coverage offered by the New York Times, he states 
rhetorically, “If this were true of a great metropolitan daily, one may imagine how much Haitian 
news was being reported at Gopher Prairie.”64  In Montague’s study, the people of the United 
States, particularly in the West and South, viewed Haiti as an unimportant backwater republic.  
They feared the war in Europe and considered the Haitian intervention secondary.  
 Montague did discuss racial issues within Haiti, but did not extrapolate U.S. racial 
attitudes from their treatment of the natives.  He emphasizes the divisions between northern and 
southern Haiti throughout the country’s history, and the racial divide between the affranchi elites 
and the africain peasantry.  He blamed these divisions for the revolutionary cycle which occurred 
before the U.S. intervention, and credited the U.S. and the Dartiguenave government for stopping 
the chaos. 
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 The wider historiographical conversation about the history of American diplomacy and 
foreign policy was influenced by the works of William Appleman Williams, who laid the 
foundations for the emerging Wisconsin School of diplomatic history in 1959 with The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy.  In this work, Williams revised the narrative of American expansionism 
from a triumphalist view of expanded liberties to a declension narrative marked by a pursuit of 
empire.  In his introduction, Williams described the relationship between the United States and 
Cuba as a tragedy because, in the sixty years Cuba spent in America’s shadow, from San Juan 
Hill to the Bay of Pigs, the United States had gradually transformed from a liberator into a 
taskmaster.  Yet, Williams stressed that the United States did not act with malice aforethought, 
and that the interventions were natural results of men who held internally-inconsistent values.65 
 The primary motivator for the United States’ empire, Williams argued, was the need for 
free trade and expanded markets.  This focus upon markets and capitalistic expansion served as 
an escapist outlet for the contradictions of class and racial conflict which plagued the nation’s 
core.  To assuage these problems, the United States expanded its periphery.  The genesis of this 
capitalistic expansionism was John Hay’s notes on the Open Door policy toward China.  He 
described this policy as “the liberal policy of informal empire or free trade imperialism.”66  
Williams’s dim view of American expansionism has influenced every other scholar of American 
foreign relations since the 1950s, as well as the New Left of the 1960s. 
The Post-Colonialists 
The Wisconsin School, as well as the successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the 
1950s and 1960s allowed U.S. historians to re-examine the Haitian conflict through a racial lens. 
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Additionally, the focus of the conversation shifted away from the motivations and actions of the 
colonizers and toward the voices and actions of the Haitian people.  The post-colonialist school 
understood the Haitian imperialist venture as the foreign policy version of Jim Crow.  They also 
examined the ways in which the domestic policies of the United States influenced the actions of 
the United States in its wider empire more generally and Haiti more specifically. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, studies of the American South and its relation to expansionism 
emerged.  In 1964, African-American historian Rubin Francis Weston wrote on the racial 
motivations behind U.S. expansionism in his dissertation at Syracuse University, which he 
expanded and published as Racism in U.S. Imperialism in 1972.  Meanwhile, Robert E. May of 
Louisiana State University wrote a study examining the role of the antebellum South in abortive 
attempts to expand to the Caribbean to preserve and expand slavery.  His 1973 book, The 
Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 serves as a complement to Weston’s study, 
and both share a thesis of expansionism as a nationalized project with Southern origins. 
Weston argued that both imperialists and anti-imperialists exhibited racial prejudice.  
While proponents of U.S. expansion used paternalist arguments of both racial superiority and 
moral uplift to justify imposing American rule on non-white peoples, opponents argued against 
expansion precisely because non-white peoples could never adapt to U.S.-style democracy.67  In 
his discussion of the American intervention in Haiti, Weston noted that Josephus Daniels, 
Secretary of the Navy during the 1915 intervention, was a Southern Democrat who staffed the 
Occupation with Southerners and who had asserted that the Southern position on race was bound 
to become the national position.68  Weston’s thesis was that the United States’ dreams of 
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expansion were, at their heart, motivated by a desire to spread so-called “Anglo-Saxon 
civilization” and bring non-white groups under the imperial banner.  Throughout his book, 
Weston identified Southern positions which later became nationalized, and identifies Wilsonian 
internationalism as a particularly Southern foreign policy, in opposition to the Northern 
isolationists, who nevertheless shared their Southern counterparts’ ideas about race. 
May’s book on the Southern origins of expansionism points to the sectional crisis over 
slavery which followed the acquisition of territory from Mexico.  “In the 1850s, manifest destiny 
became sectionalized.”69  The book focused on the Spanish Empire’s policy on slavery, and the 
movement to emancipate the Afro-Cuban population, as well as the American South’s dire 
opposition to the policy, which likely doomed the plan.  “The administration […] let it be known 
in diplomatic circles that the United States would not tolerate Negro rule in Cuba.”70  May also 
covered the Filibusters, American freebooters who overthrew Latin American governments in an 
attempt to annex them to the United States.  The limited chronological scope of May’s book 
renders its usefulness in discussing the twentieth-century American empire paltry.  Nevertheless, 
May’s central thesis: Caribbean expansionism was a product of nationalized Southern interests, is 
illuminating when discussed in this context. 
Hans Schmidt, in his 1971 history of the Haitian occupation, considered the Haitian 
adventure as part of a century of empire-building in Latin America.  Schmidt asserted that the 
United States assumed a free-trade and open-door policy in areas already under European 
hegemony such as China.  Echoing Williams, he characterized this policy as “liberal 
internationalism.”  However, in the western hemisphere, the United States established its own 
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hegemonic empire.  He characterized this policy as an attempt to make the Caribbean an 
“American Mediterranean” and that the Good Neighbor Policy of the Franklin Roosevelt 
administration assumed the hegemonic dominance of the United States over Caribbean affairs.  
Schmidt recognized that the Haitian occupation happened after and was influenced by the Indian 
Wars, Chinese exclusion, and the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan.  “The military logic of guerilla 
warfare…dictated vicious hunt-and-kill tactics which were most conventionally rationalized in 
terms of racial and cultural prejudices.”71  The violence of the guerrilla campaign against the caco 
rebels became a war of racial violence. 
While the United States justified its intervention with talk of democracy and equality 
under law, the racist cultural norms of the country enabled exploitation of the Haitian natives.  
Schmidt further argued that the United States focused primarily on the material improvement of 
Haiti rather than political or social reform.  He saw this focus on “pragmatic, materialistic uplift” 
as an outgrowth of the technocratic impulses of the Progressive movement.  These impulses 
assumed the occupiers were enlightened and the Haitians were cogs in the great machine of 
progress.72  The occupiers built roads, hospitals, and telegraph lines but did little to strengthen 
Haitian democracy or the Haitian economy; the internal improvements benefited only foreign 
investors. 
 Mary Renda, professor at Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts, wrote a 2001 
monograph on the occupation, Taking Haiti, which examines the culture of racism and 
imperialism which allowed the United States to exploit the Haitians while ostensibly engaged in a 
humanitarian mission.  She specifically addresses paternalistic racism, which assumed white men 
had a duty to rule over darker-skinned men and save them from their naturally-violent tendencies.  
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She considers the United States a republican empire, which governs its people democratically at 
home but does not apply these principles evenly to its subject possessions.  Overseas colonial 
expansion merely continued the trend of continental expansion which began in the nineteenth 
century.  “The republic itself was, from the first, constructed out of empire insofar as colonial 
settlement and Indian Wars established its very foundation.”73  Because the United States 
experienced imperialism from its very inception, the pervading culture of imperialism encouraged 
expansion and directly affected the mindset of the Occupation administrators. 
 Renda does not see the Haitian occupation as a backwater conflict.  Instead, she devotes 
the second half of her book to images of Haiti through the popular culture of the United States.  
She believes the Haitian occupation worked to shape U.S. foreign and domestic policy and 
cemented interventionism as a key element of U.S. relations with Latin America.  “Foreign 
interventions and territorial seizures overlapped in time and personnel and built on one another to 
refine the techniques of imperial control and influence.  Taken together, they formed a solid 
overseas foundation for new cultural departures in the United States.”74  She considers the Haitian 
occupation as an important cultural milestone for the United States, influencing music, literature, 
and poetry.   
Two studies examined the attitude of black Americans toward the American empire.  The 
first, a compilation of newspaper articles edited by African-American historian George P. Marks 
III in 1971, focused on the black press and its response to American imperialism from 1898-1900.  
The second, a 2002 article by Henry Lewis Suggs in the Journal of African American History 
examined the attitude of the African American press and community toward the Haitian 
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occupation specifically.  Both articles drew complex conclusions about how African-Americans 
in the United States understood foreign expansion, and reveal how the black population defied 
simple categorization regarding imperialism. 
Marks’ anthology began with the annexation of Hawaii, and continued through the 
Spanish-American War.  He found a pattern emerged in which the black press supported 
imperialism when it could be linked to the domestic cause of civil rights.  For instance, the black 
newspapers of 1898 such as the Kansas City American Citizen and the Indianapolis Freeman, 
supported war with Spain because military service would build public support for equal rights.75  
Annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico shifted black opinion away from imperialism, as 
they viewed their hopes of equality-through-expansion betrayed. 
In his article, Suggs concluded that the black press did not initially oppose the 
intervention, as the occupation continued it grew more hostile to U.S. foreign policy and 
demanded immediate removal of troops from Haiti.  “Despite heavy criticism in prominent 
African-American newspapers, forty-nine out of sixty-nine articles, both African-American and 
white, endorsed American intervention in the Caribbean from 1904 to 1919.”76  Sugg’s article 
shows an interesting and often-overlooked segment of foreign affairs:  the domestic response of 
minorities.  The black press did not oppose intervention to establish democracy, but opposed 
making Haiti a protectorate and the racial injustices perpetuated both at home and abroad.  Race 
permeated and defined the Haitian occupation and reflected racial policies in the domestic sphere.  
However, African-Americans were not monolithic in their opposition to expansion in general. 
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The continued legacy of Williams and the Wisconsin School is evident in the 2009 
collection, Colonial Crucible:  Empire in the Making of the Modern American State.  This 
collection of essays, compiled and edited by Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Sarano, re-
examines and re-contextualizes the relationship between the United States and its empire.  While 
previous studies largely adopted a model emphasizing the centralized nature of the imperial 
system, the authors of Colonial Crucible instead stress the de-centralized nature of the United 
States’ empire, as it lacked a uniform colonial policy which applied to every territory.   
The authors of Colonial Crucible emphasize domestic policies which were first 
implemented in the empire’s periphery (the territories), only later making their way back to the 
core (the continental United States).  Policies relating to public health, immigration, eugenics, 
prison reform, and police all were implemented on the colonial periphery and then traveled back 
to the core.  In this way, the American experiment with colonialism was not short-lived or out of 
character for the republic, and formed the basis for the expanded powers of the federal 
government in the twentieth century.77  Colonial Crucible sacrifices breadth of scope for depth, 
and so concentrates almost all of its analysis on Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba.  
Nevertheless, Colonial Crucible  is relevant to the study of Haiti because it explains the complex 
interactions between the foreign and domestic spheres, particularly the Progressive-era policies 
such as eugenics and immigration restrictionism which were developed in colonial laboratories. 
Haitian Voices 
 Most Haitian accounts of the Occupation were written after the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
in 1934, and form a corpus of a nationalistic narrative which emphasized the heroism of the caco 
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rebels and condemned both the U.S. occupiers and the ruling class which collaborated with them.  
The generation which came of age during the Occupation rejected the Francophilia and European 
orientation of their parents and embraced Haitian nationalism.  The caco campaign provided the 
heroic figures necessary for nationalistic myth-making, and most French-language Haitian 
historians told a narrative of dauntless rebels fighting to preserve the independence of the black 
republic against Yankee oppression. 
 One of the earliest French-language Haitian histories of the Occupation was by Dantès 
Bellegarde, an affranchi diplomat who served as Minister Plenipotentiary to both France and the 
United States during the Occupation.  His history, La Résistance Haïtienne, was completed in 
1937, only three years after the Americans withdrew from the country.  A dominant theme of this 
work is the resistance of Haitians to those who would violate their territorial integrity, as well as 
the United States’ inability to provide a national-security justification for their intervention.  In 
his first chapter, Bellegarde defended the actions of the crowd which murdered President Sam, 
who he considered a dictator responsible for the massacre of political prisoners.   
It should be noted immediately that no insult had been made to the American flag. 
No citizen of the United States had been molested in his person or wronged in his property 
during the unfortunate events that had just happened. The crowd that had entered the 
French legation to pull out Vilbrun Guillaume Sam had not manifested hostile feeling to 
France or her representative: it had thought to simply do an act of justice by lynching the 
man that it held responsible--rightly or wrongly--for the massacre of political prisoners.78 
 Bellegarde likewise emphasized American violations of Haitian financial sovereignty.  
He devoted a chapter to the American loan of 1922, which he stopped short of describing as 
extortion.  Bellegarde took pride in Haiti’s financial standing and credit rating, and derided the 
United States for forcing Haiti to acquiesce to the loan in exchange for foreign investment.79  He 
                                                            
78 Dantés Bellegarde, La Résistance Haïtienne (Montreal, QC, Les Éditions Beauchemin, 1937), 32. 




presented President Dartiguenave as an ineffectual defender of Haiti’s honor and sovereignty, 
who nevertheless fell out of favor with the occupiers.  He reserved most of his bile for Louis 
Borno, who he regarded as a puppet for John Russell, the American High Commissioner in an 
arrangement he dubbed “La dictature bicéphale,” or “The two-headed dictatorship.”80   
 Bellegarde’s focus on political and financial matters contrasted with other Haitian 
historians such as Roger Gaillard, whose seven-volume history of the Occupation, Les Blancs 
Débarquent, devoted multiple volumes to the military history of the caco campaign.  Published in 
1987, each volume focuses on a particular personality or theme involved in the Occupation.  In 
particular, Gaillard emphasized the military prowess of the bandit-soldier leaders who caused so 
much consternation to the Marines during the guerrilla campaign.  Volume VI was a biography 
and military history of the guerrilla leader Charlemagne Perault and his campaign, and included 
extensive records of correspondence between Marine commanders concerning their campaign 
against the rebels.  Due to the illiteracy of the caco leader and his followers, such records do not 
exist on the opposing side.  What emerges, then, is a portrait of the guerrilla through the eyes of 
his enemies and his admirers, and a narrative emerges of a peasant-soldier’s turn into a national 
hero.  Volume VII of the same series continued after Charlemagne’s death and followed his 
successor Benoît Batraville, who met a similar fate at the hands of the Marines in 1920.   
 The Haitian contributors to the historiographical conversation served as the foundation of 
the post-colonial school, providing the primary sources and French-language material which 
differentiated that school from the isolationists and imperialists.  Nevertheless, the lack of literary 
sources from the africain actors in the Occupation drama remains a major gap in the historical 
literature concerning this period of Haitian history.   
                                                            




 Like most histories written in the past sixty years, this study owes a debt to Williams and 
the Wisconsin School, as all current books and articles since Williams reflect his conscious or 
unconscious influence.  This study’s evaluation of American foreign policy has little room for 
benevolence or altruism, and adheres closely to the Wisconsin School’s image of a venal, self-
contradictory United States unable to live up to its purported ideals.  This study seeks to align 
itself with the post-colonialists and expand the historiographical conversation to the pivotal role 
that the Service Technique educational system had upon the Haitian psyche.  This agricultural 
and technical school was essentially an exported Tuskegee Institute, the dominant black college 
during the era of segregation in the United States.  This system of education was chosen and 
imposed upon Haiti specifically because Haiti was the black republic.  The United States created 
a school system for colonized peoples because they were building a dependent nation, not a self-
ruling one.  Likewise, this study relies upon Haitian sources concerning the loan of 1922 and 
connects it to the present-day dependence upon foreign aid which keeps Haiti in the United 
States’ sphere of influence. 
 The core-periphery relationship between Haiti and the United States examined in this 
study predominantly runs one way.  Unlike the territories examined in Colonial Crucible, Haiti 
saw the implementation of pre-existing policies which existed in the American South.  However, 
just like in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, Haiti was a product of a decentralized colonial policy, 
administered with little oversight except for the State Department after 1922.   
 This study seeks to expand upon a theme first elucidated by Weston and May in the 
1970s, but little touched upon in later literature:  American colonial racism as an outgrowth of 
Jim Crow.  Expansionism was based on the idea of the “white man’s burden,” a paternalistic idea 
that only “civilized” Anglo-Saxon peoples had the birthright to rule and that non-white peoples 




nationalized during the Progressive Era, with Northern judges, politicians, and scientists 







RACE RELATIONS IN PROGRESSIVE-ERA UNITED STATES 
To understand how the United States exported the Jim Crow system, it is first necessary 
to understand the system itself.  Woodrow Wilson, like most white men in the United States, 
believed in the inherent inequality of races.  Wilson was born into a world where slavery was 
legal and came of age in a world where the specter of Jim Crow hung over the United States.  By 
the time of the Haitian invasion and occupation in 1915, race relations had entered a period 
described by black historian Rayford Logan as the “nadir of American race relations.”  The 
Supreme Court nullified civil rights legislation and denied black citizens their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.81  Blacks faced segregation across the country.  Intimidation from the Ku 
Klux Klan prevented them from voting.  Minstrel shows portrayed them as buffoons.  The motion 
picture Birth of a Nation, a favorite of Wilson, glorified the Ku Klux Klan and portrayed black 
politicians as corrupt and uncivilized.  Scientific racism pervaded academia.  Black people in the 
United States lived in a shadow world, hidden away from polite society and kept in an inferior 
position.  The segregation system which oppressed black citizens in the American core would 
influence the system which would oppress Haitians on the American periphery. 
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White Supremacy in Post- Reconstruction America 
White supremacist Americans held a fundamental belief in the non-assimilability of other 
races.  During the first period of American imperialism, westward expansion, white settlers 
displaced the indigenous peoples and the American government sequestered them into Indian 
reservations.  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 blocked immigration from East Asia and 
deported Chinese immigrants.   
 Indeed, the Reconstruction era immediately following the American Civil War proved 
that white society in both the Northern and Southern states did not know what to do with the 
black slaves once freed.  They had no plans to integrate these new citizens into white society.82  
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction governments worked to secure the voting rights of the 
newly-freed slaves.  While the Constitution and federal laws guaranteed suffrage to blacks, 
whites used intimidation, poll taxes, literacy tests, and outright vote-rigging to suppress the black 
vote.  U.S. Senator and Governor of South Carolina Ben Tillman said in 1900, “We have 
scratched our heads to find out how we could eliminate the last one of them.  We stuffed ballot 
boxes.  We shot them.  We are not ashamed of it.”83   
White hostility towards blacks stemmed from fear of black rule, and the white Southerner 
could point to Haiti as an example par excellance of the futility of Negro rule.  If the black citizen 
could vote, so said the South, white Christian society would descend into madness and chaos.  
Thus, the masked violence of the Ku Klux Klan and the Red Shirts was justified in defense of 
civilization.  Journalist and orator H.W. Grady of Georgia said in 1889, “It would be well if the 
Northern partisan understands that the Negro vote can never again control the South.  The North 
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may surrender its liberties to the federal election law, but never again will a single state, North or 
South, be delivered to the control of an ignorant and inferior race.”84 
The North did little to interfere with the schemes of Southerners.  By the mid-1870s, the 
idealism of Reconstruction had faded.  Thomas Nast, a Northern Republican cartoonist, viewed 
the enfranchisement of blacks as a valuable goal and virtuous outcome of the Civil War.  In an 
1865 cartoon published in Harper’s Weekly, Nast depicts Lady Liberty standing beside a black 
war veteran.  The man stands on crutches, maimed from his service, but with a proud expression.  
The caption reads, “And not this man?”  The message of the cartoon to Northerners of 1865 was 
clear: the black man fought bravely to preserve the Union; he ought to have a voice in its 
government.85  By 1874, Nast had become cynical.  He viewed black rule and black votes as a 
farce.  In a cartoon he published in the same periodical he had used to argue for black suffrage, he 
mocked black citizens and black legislators.  The cartoon depicts two black politicians angrily 
shouting at each other in a state legislature.  Unlike the black soldier Nast drew in 1865, these 
men are caricatures.  One is a thick-lipped buffoon, and the other is an obese giant raising his fists 
and preparing for a fist-fight.  All the while a white politician hold his face in his hands, ashamed 
of the childlike display while Lady Liberty admonishes the brawlers as she stands in front of an 
inscription reading, “Let Us Have Peace.”  The caption reads, “Colored Rule in a 
Reconstructed(?) State.”  After nine years of black participation in the democratic process, Nast 
now believed civil rights a lost cause.86   
In 1877, Rutherford B. Hayes withdrew the last federal troops from the South.  Southern 
votes had secured his election as president when the disputed election of 1876 went to the House 
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of Representatives.  Hayes, though he personally wished to guarantee political equality for blacks, 
could not do so because he would have lost the election without Southern support.  He naïvely 
believed that the South would protect the rights of its black citizens once federal troops went 
home.87  In the following decades of the nineteenth century, Southern Democrats in Congress 
blocked what little measures the Republicans took toward securing civil rights and voting rights 
for all citizens.   
The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court in the second half of the nineteenth century was dominated by 
Northerners, appointed by Republicans, and consistently ruled against civil rights legislation and 
its enforcement.  While the Supreme Court during the prewar period had been an instrument of 
nationalism, upholding all but four acts of Congress presented before it for judicial review, the 
Court during the postwar period became increasingly anti-national government.  From 1870-73, it 
overturned six acts of Congress.88  In 1883, the court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and 
severely curtailed the anti-Klan Enforcement Act of 1871.  The Court heard five cases: United 
States v. Stanley; United States v. Ryan; United States v. Nichols; United States v. Singleton; and 
Robinson et ux. v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad, consolidated into one issue for review.  The 
Court issued an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, which held a narrow and 
restrictive reading of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Amendments applied only 
to state actors, not individuals.  In his decision, Bradley stated,  
[The Fourteenth Amendment] does not invest congress with power to legislate 
upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation; but to provide modes of 
relief against state legislation, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize 
congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide 
modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers, 
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executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the 
amendment. 89 
 The Supreme Court effectively nullified any effort by the national government to protect 
the civil rights blacks from discrimination by private individuals and businesses.  The Civil 
Rights Cases allowed room for states to pass laws which mandated segregation and curtailed 
voting rights even further.  In 1896, thirteen years after the Civil Rights Cases neutered federal 
enforcement of civil rights, the Court upheld state-mandated segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.  
The case concerned an 1890 Louisiana law which provided separate traveling cars on railways for 
whites and blacks, and punished anyone who did not travel in his race’s designated car.  Homer 
Plessy, a mixed-race man, boarded a whites-only train car and was arrested for it.  The Supreme 
Court heard the case and issued a 7-1 decision which upheld Louisiana’s law.  Plessy v. Ferguson 
established the “separate but equal” principle in constitutional law and denied that segregation 
deprived black citizens of their rights.  Justice Henry Billings Brown delivered the Court’s 
majority opinion, which stated: 
The object of [The Fourteenth Amendment] was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not 
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either […] The [plaintiff’s] argument also assumes that social prejudices 
may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except 
by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition.  If the 
two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, 
a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals.90 
The Court, through these two cases, argued away the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
implications.  The national government could not impose laws to preserve civil rights, and could 
not set racial equality as a policy agenda at all.  In its decision, the Court ignored the reality of 
segregation: facilities designated for blacks were almost universally inferior to those designated 
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for whites.  Segregated facilities and businesses became entrenched in Southern society, 
relegating black citizens to inferiority. 
In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court answered questions about the civil rights of 
inhabitants of the United States’ new overseas territories, recently acquired from Spain during the 
Spanish-American War of 1898.  The Court, which had chipped away the Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of black Americans to nothingness, decided that residents of these new territories did not 
deserve complete protection under the Constitution.  In 1901, the Court issued Downes v. Bidwell, 
the first of the “insular cases.”  The case concerned a merchant, Samuel Downes, who imported 
oranges from Puerto Rico and had to pay import duties on them in New York.  The plaintiff 
argued that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provided for uniform duties throughout the 
United States and that Puerto Rico was part of the United States.  The Court decided 5-4 against 
the plaintiff concerning the import duties, and the decision held long-reaching implications 
concerning the rights and status of the United States’ colonial territories. 
The Court held that Puerto Rico and other newly-annexed territories were not a part of 
the United States proper.  Congress therefore held the power to administer the territories 
separately from the rest of the United States.  Because of this special status, Article I, Section 8 of 
the Constitution did not apply to Puerto Rico and the port inspector of New York could force Mr. 
Downes to pay import duties which did not apply to the rest of the United States.  Significantly, 
the decision by Justice Brown justified the non-applicability of the Constitution on racial grounds, 
considering the inhabitants of the territories to be “alien races, differing from us in religion, 
customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought.”91  Justice White, in his concurring 
opinion, considered that the United States had the right to annex territory without conferring 
                                                            




citizenship upon its residents, referring to Puerto Ricans as “and uncivilized race” and “absolutely 
unfit to receive [citizenship].”92   
 A 1904 case, Gonzales v. Williams, further specified that Puerto Ricans were not full 
citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The case concerned Isabel Gonzales, a Puerto Rican 
who moved to New York in 1902 to marry the father of her unborn child.  The New York 
authorities detained her as an alien.  While the Court determined that she was not an alien and 
subject to immigration restrictions, she could not be a citizen by virtue of her race and birthplace.    
The Gonzales decision created a nebulous intermediary category between alien and citizen: the 
non-citizen national.  Ms. Gonzales was a citizen of Puerto Rico, but the Court declined to answer 
if this meant she was a citizen of the United States.93   
 The insular cases perpetuated U.S. colonialism by denying equal rights to residents of 
U.S. territories and granting only partial protection by the Constitution.  The insular cases based 
their conclusions not only on racism but geographic discrimination, allowing the United States to 
reap the benefits of imperialism without securing the blessings and protections of liberty to the 
colonized peoples.  The Puerto Ricans were dependent and unequal partners in the American 
republic.  The American occupation of Haiti would follow these principles.  Because the Haitians 
were an alien race, they did not deserve an Anglo-Saxon form of government like democracy.  
Because they were not a part of the United Stated despite military occupation by the United 
States, the occupiers did not need to follow the Constitution even as a guideline for governing the 
island. 
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Race and Expansionism 
The “Great Migration” of blacks from the South toward Northern industrial centers 
heightened racial tensions in the North as well, and only emphasized the inability of white society 
to accommodate blacks as equal citizens.  In 1890, numerous Southern and Northern voices 
called for deportation of blacks from the United States.  Senator Wilkinson Call of Florida urged 
the United States to annex Cuba and use the island as a black homeland.  Other proposals called 
for mass emigration of blacks to Africa, and others suggested an American protectorate over 
Haiti.  The Northern press ridiculed such proposals, but showed little enthusiasm for blacks in its 
own cities.  The Chicago Tribune lamented the poor treatment of black people in the South, but 
argued that they would be even unhappier in the North.  The paper stated, “The instinct which has 
kept the Afro-Americans in the South has been kinder to them than the mistaken philanthropists 
would be if they could carry out their plans for an exodus to the North.”94 
The poor state of race relations after the Civil War was an impetus for American 
expansionism.  By 1890, the United States had closed its continental frontier, and needed more 
territory to sequester its black underclass away from the white majority.  The proposals to deport 
black citizens to Africa, Cuba, or Haiti resembled the reservation policy the federal government 
used on the American Indians.  The United States sought territorial expansion for its white 
citizens, but these new territories came with non-white inhabitants.  Expansion brought minorities 
into the fold which required more expansion to pacify.  While mass deportation of black citizens 
did not occur, the presence of an exile argument in the national discourse over civil rights 
suggests an implicit recognition by white America of its right to colonize the western hemisphere.  
                                                            




Indeed, the North American Review said in 1881, “in no time or clime have the Caucasian race 
consented to live with inferior ones save as rulers.”95 
 In Haiti’s case, the U.S. intervened as a pre-emptive strike against European powers 
under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.  The shift in interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine occurred as the United States acquired colonies after its victory in the Spanish-American 
War of 1898.  The Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-3, when British, German, and Italian creditors 
blockaded Venezuela for defaulting on its debts, threatened to allow European powers to re-
establish colonial power in the Americas.  In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that 
the United States held the moral prerogative to act as a police power in the western hemisphere.  
He felt that “Chronic wrongdoing…may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to 
the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of 
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.” 96  The Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine firmly established the principle of interventionism in U.S. 
foreign policy. 
 Elected in 1912, Woodrow Wilson inherited and expanded the doctrine of 
interventionism from his predecessors.  In 1913, during his first year as president, Wilson 
intervened in Mexico.  He held that the United States had a “moral duty” to aid a weaker state in 
its pursuit of democracy.  He believed in a “spiritual connection” between the nations of the 
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Americas, and that darker-skinned peoples needed U.S. tutelage to achieve self-government.97  In 
his 1915 address to Congress, Wilson characterized his Latin American policy as cooperative, 
and meant to preserve the independence of the Caribbean and Latin American states.  He 
declared, “This is Pan-Americanism.  It has none of the spirit of empire in it.  It is the 
embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and 
mutual service.”98 
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Thomas Nast’s 1865 cartoon appeals to patriotic sentiment by reminding the white readership of Harper’s 
Weekly of the sacrifices made by black soldiers in the Civil War.  The caption, “Franchise: And Not This 
Man?” argues for black suffrage and demonstrates the hope for racial harmony and equality which 







Thomas Nast’s 1874 cartoon ridicules black politicians by reducing them to caricatures.  Columbia, 
a personification of the United States, admonishes the brawling politicians and warns them, “You are aping 
the lowest whites.  If you disgrace your race this way you had better take the back seats.”  This cartoon 
illustrates the contempt white Americans, even white liberals such as Nast, held for black men in places of 
power.  Because black rule was synonymous with corruption in the United States, it was synonymous with 









Scientific Racism and Paternalism 
 Wilson likewise continued the national policy of Southern appeasement in regards to civil 
rights.  Wilson’s childhood in Virginia and his academic background as president of Princeton 
University instilled scientific racism into his worldview.  Early anthropologists considered it an 
axiom that Europeans possessed innate qualities which made them superior to other races and 
nations.  The scientific establishment latched onto the principles of biological evolution 
established in On the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin and extrapolated justifications of 
imperialism and subjugation of other races.  Social Darwinism did not limit itself to racism, but 
eventually broadened and became the eugenics movement.   
 Eugenics, which sought to purify the human gene pool through sterilization and 
euthanasia, reached the peak of its strength in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s.  
American eugenicist Madison Grant published The Passing of the Great Race, which organized 
the peoples of the world into a concrete racial hierarchy, with the “Nordic” peoples at its apex.  
Unsurprisingly, Grant placed black people at the base of this hierarchy.  He spoke of race 
relations with materialistic determinism, confident that the shape of a man’s skull and the color of 
his skin determined his intelligence and ability to participate in society.  “It has taken us fifty 
years to learn that speaking English, wearing good clothes and going to school and church do not 
transform the Negro into a white man.”99  Indeed, Grant blamed blacks for what he perceived as a 
“deterioration” of the white race.  Once the government emancipated the slaves, the white man 
was forced to till his own fields and work his own factories, essentially forced to work below his 
“natural” station.100   
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 Psychologists likewise underestimated the natural abilities of black people.  Louis M. 
Terman, who revised the IQ test in 1916, administered tests designed for literate English-
speaking adults to illiterate black children and Spanish-speaking children.  Their low scores on 
these tests confirmed his pre-existing biases about race.   
Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given 
instruction which is concrete and practical. They cannot master abstractions, but they can 
often be made efficient workers, able to look out for themselves.  There is no possibility 
at present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although 
from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually 
prolific breeding.101   
Terman and researchers like him based their conclusions on circular reasoning and a 
priori assumptions about the inability and physiological inferiority of non-white races.  They 
found prominent support among Progressives of the era, such as Woodrow Wilson who signed 
New Jersey’s sterilization bill into law during his tenure as governor.102 
 Because respected academics and politicians likened black people to mentally-retarded or 
immature white people, white America viewed non-white peoples at home and abroad as 
children.  The United States, never one to think of itself as a tyrant, presumed itself a parent or 
steward of the inferior races.  Wilson’s foreign policy and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine 
allowed the United States to act as an older brother and protector of the Latin American republics.  
Children could not yet achieve self-government, and often needed violent correction to punish 
bad behavior.  This particular form of racism is paternalism.   
While paternalism ostensibly meant to mitigate abuses of power and tyranny, the United 
States used paternalistic racism to justify violence against colonized peoples.  A cartoon 
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published in Puck magazine in 1899 depicted a classroom with Uncle Sam as a teacher and the 
states personified as obedient pupils (See Figure 3).  The new possessions of the United States, 
the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, are rambunctious children.  The caption of the 
cartoon read, “Now, children, you’ve got to learn these lessons whether you want to or not! But 
just take a look at the class ahead of you, and remember that, in a little while, you will feel as glad 
to be here as they are!”  A lesson on the blackboard preaches the virtues of self-government, but 
qualifies, “The U.S. must govern its new territories with or without their consent until they can 
govern themselves.”  Perhaps most significantly, none of the pupils in the school house are black.  
The only black child in the room is a window-washer.103  This implied that although Filipinos, 
Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans could one day achieve self-government, black men could 
not. 
Another cartoon published in Marines Magazine in 1917 (Figure 4) pertains specifically 
to the violence of the Haitian occupation.  A towering figure labeled “U.S. Marine” picks up and 
shakes a Haitian caco.  He angrily shouts, “Listen, son!  Do unto your brothers as you’d hav’em 
do unto you.  Savvy?”104  The cacos were petulant children unable or unwilling to learn basic 
morals.  They needed the strong Christianizing influence of the U.S. Marine Corps to become 
moral actors.  According to Mary Renda, “Paternalism, we might say, was the cultural flagship of 
the United States in Haiti.”105  Wilson’s international vision divided the world into mature nations 
and infantile nations, and ascribed mastery to the more powerful nations.106  Paternalism 
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essentially denied Haiti the right to national self-determination that the Wilson administration 
espoused.   
 In 1918, Woodrow Wilson addressed Congress with his “Fourteen Points” concerning 
Europe following the First World War.  Wilson declared the United States had committed its guns 
and men to the European war not for territorial gain, but for a higher purpose.  He asserted that all 
nations had the right to determine their own institutions and laws, apart from any imperialist or 
colonial overlords.  The context of his address, however, concerned only the dissolution of the 
empires of the Central Powers.  He stated, 
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.107 
Essentially, the Wilsonian vision of a postwar world included the intact colonial empires of the 
victors.  Wilson applied the self-determination principle inconsistently:  What Wilson espoused 
for the Poles, Hungarians, and Serbs did not apply to Filipinos, Cubans, or Haitians.  
                                                            






Dalrymple, Louis.  “School Begins.”  Puck.  January 25, 1899. 
 This Puck cartoon depicts the new colonial possessions of the United States (The Philippines, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Cuba) as petulant children and the United States as well-behaved pupils.  Uncle 
Sam scolds the new students.  The caption reads “Now, children, you’ve got to learn these lessons whether 
you want to or not! But just take a look at the class ahead of you, and remember that, in a little while, you 
will feel as glad to be here as they are!”  The blackboard reads, “The consent of the governed is a good 
thing in theory, but very rare in fact. — England has governed her colonies whether they consented or not. 
By not waiting for their consent she has greatly advanced the world’s civilization. — The U.S. must govern 
its new territories with or without their consent until they can govern themselves.”  Significantly, the only 
black child in the schoolhouse is not a student at all, but a window-washer.  Although Haiti is not addressed 






Woyshner, Paul.  “The Missionary.”  Marines Magazine, April 1917. 
This cartoon, drawn by a U.S. Marine involved in the campaign against the cacos, portrays the Marine as a 
father figure to the cacos, who appear as petulant children.  It illustrates the contemporary attitude towards 







THE INTERVENTION, 1915 
 
In July 1915, a mob murdered Haitian President Vilbrun Guillame Sam and dismembered 
his body.  The United States leaped at the opportunity to deploy marines to Port-au-Prince to 
ostensibly protect Americans in Haiti.  The marines met little resistance and soon secured the 
capital.  The New York Times remarked, “The force being sent to Haiti is much larger than is 
necessary for the mere protection of foreign interests.”108  Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
justified the intervention: “In landing marines in Haiti we acted on account of two reasons: first, 
that it was in the interest of humanity and, second, that in the case we had not taken the step, in all 
probability some other nation would have felt called upon to do so.”109   
By August, the United States established a protectorate over the island, confirmed by a 
treaty in September.  The State department demanded supervision over the customs houses and 
finances, and forbade Haiti from ceding territory or negotiating with any other foreign power.  
Lansing described the American demands as “unselfish,” and “it is a temporary and by no means 
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permanent arrangement.  We are not even asking for Mole St. Nicholas.”110  The Haitian 
Gendarmerie became an extension of the U.S. Marine Corps, with American officers and native 
soldiers.  The Gendarmerie would be the most effective tool the United States used to uphold its 
Haitian client state.   
Haiti Under American Administration 
 The Marine Corps provided hefty incentives for American soldiers to join the Haitian 
military.  U.S. Marines who joined the Gendarmerie received two paychecks for their double role, 
a career that one U.S. Marine described as “fat jobs for the bachelor officers.”  Likewise, enlisted 
men who joined the Haitian military used it as an easy way to advance their rank and career.  
Gunnery sergeants and first sergeants in the U.S. Corps used the Haitian corps to advance to first 
lieutenants, and lieutenants quickly became captains.  Gendarmerie officers held power 
disproportionate to their rank.  Officers became “communal advisers,” which effectively allowed 
them to rule as military governors over villages with little oversight.  The Haitian ambassador to 
the United States complained to the State Department about these arrangements.  “The American 
officers…wish to act as administrators of the commune and not rest within their powers…as 
intended by the president.”111 
The United States likewise wrested control of public works and the department of justice 
from the Haitians.112  The positions occupied by white Americans, though nominally advisory, 
held tremendous power over the native government.  The financial advisor enforced the will of 
the United States by refusing salaries to the president and legislative council of Haiti.  The 
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Marines prohibited the possession of firearms without U.S. Military authorization, while the press 
was tightly restricted and criticism of the occupiers was prohibited.113  The public works 
administrators used Haitian money to complete the American-backed railroads, and the 
Gendarmerie crushed domestic opposition.114   
The First Election 
 Upon securing Port-au-Prince, the United States sought to retroactively legalize its 
invasion through undemocratic means.  To maintain the fiction of Haitian independence, the 
marines supervised a presidential election in August.  The two primary candidates standing were 
Rosalvo Bobo, a caco leader from the north, and Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, an affranchi from 
the south.  According to Smedley Butler, “When the National Assembly met, the marines stood in 
the aisles until the man selected by the American Minister was made President…I won’t say we 
put him in.  The State Department might object.”115  Secretary Lansing sent a memorandum to 
Admiral W.B. Caperton:  “Allow election of President whenever Haitians wish.  United States 
prefers election of Dartiguenave…The United States insists the Haitian government will grant no 
territorial concessions to any foreign governments.”116  Despite endorsing the election, Lansing 
held reservations about the government’s actions.  He wrote to Wilson:   
I confess that this method of negotiation, with our marines policing the Haytien 
capital, is high-handed.  It does not meet my sense of a nation’s sovereign rights and is 
more or less and exercise of force and a violation of Haytien independence.  From a 
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practical standpoint, however, I feel that it is the only thing to do if we intend to cure the 
anarchy and disorder which prevails in that Republic.117 
 The undemocratic sham election in Haiti resembled the fraudulent elections held in the 
southern United States.  If the United States could not trust blacks with democratic self-rule at 
home, there would be no democratic self-rule in Haiti.  The New York Times presented this view 
succinctly in August 1915, “Haiti is clearly incapable of self-government without assistance.”118 
The Haitian Constitution 
The U.S. had its puppet government legitimize the occupation with a treaty and 
proceeded to present it with a new constitution for ratification.  The National Assembly balked at 
the American proposals, and drafted a constitution of its own.  During deliberations on the 
constitution in June 1916, Marines armed with revolvers and led by Smedley Butler bolted the 
doors of the Assembly and presented Sténio Vincent, president of the Senate, with an order from 
President Dartiguenave dissolving the legislature.  He instructed newspapers not to print anything 
about the incident, and expunged the day’s minutes from the official records.   
The Haitian Assembly dissolved, the Marines presented the constitution directly to the 
Haitian people in a plebiscite in June 1918.  The Gendarmerie, of course, closely monitored the 
vote, distributed the ballots and counted them.  The Americans arrested any opponents of the new 
constitution who publicly expressed their opposition.  Not surprisingly, the plebiscite affirmed the 
new constitution, with 98,225 in favor and 768 opposed.  Brigade Commander John H. Russell 
wrote a special report to Washington, wherein he argued that the lopsided poll results had nothing 
to do with the American military presence or voter intimidation.  Instead, he stated that the 
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opposition simply did not vote.119  The new constitution made Haiti a protectorate of the United 
States.  It removed the prohibition on white landownership, enabling U.S. interests to firmly 
establish themselves and drive out German investors.  It moved legislative functions from the 
National Assembly to a Council of State appointed by the president.  A special article of the 
constitution retroactively validated all actions of the military occupation.120 
The Guerrilla Campaign 
The U.S. occupation harshly dealt with the natives.  In August 1916, the U.S. military 
began construction of roads and railways by resurrecting the 19th-century corvée system of 
conscripted labor, essentially re-introducing slavery to the impoverished peasantry.121  While the 
official guidelines for corvée specified that conscripted peasants required wages and shelter, the 
gendarmerie seldom followed those guidelines.  For example, in St. Marc, the Americans paid 
laborers only one Haitian gourde per week, the equivalent of twenty cents.  They did not 
compensate the peasants with meals.122   
Instead of relying on volunteers, the Gendarmerie conscripted laborers from the 
peasantry, often violently.  Capsine Altidor, a Haitian peasant from the village of Maïssade in the 
north, testified before the U.S. Senate in 1921.  Altidor told of how the gendarmes killed his sons 
when coming to collect for corvée.  A division of gendarmes led by a white officer came and 
struck his son on the head, causing him to lose a large quantity of blood.  The gendarmes then 
took the boy away, and Altidor never saw him again.  He likewise told of how the gendarmes 
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executed his second son on the roadside when he did not comply.123  Another Haitian named 
Joachin Nord testified that the gendarmes killed his wife when they arrived, and a man named 
Heraux Belloni related how the gendarmes killed his parents.124   
Baptist missionary L. Ton Evans recounted how the Marines rounded up members of his 
congregation on a Sunday in June, 1918: 
[I] saw two groups of natives, and including native members and native 
preachers who had been caught, roped tightly and cruelly together, and driven like slaves 
toward the [Gendarmerie office]…  I demanded they should be freed and permitted to 
come back with us to the House of God.  This [the corporal] sternly refused to do and 
forcibly drove them along like cattle.  Where they were put and what became of them, I 
do not know.  From the common talk of these mountain people, and what I witnessed.  I 
believe that many are caught, arrested, and roped thus on Sunday, as well as during the 
week, not merely for the "corvée," but for the sake of graft and extortion of money, when 
some would be let free again on payment of 2 or 3 gourdes.125 
 Evans spent the end of the year in a jail cell in the city of Saint-Marc, arrested by Captain 
Fitzgerald Brown on charges of inciting rebellion.  In prison he described even more brutality.  “I 
could hear the yelling and groaning of the native prisoners, as well as their being beaten and 
pounded by gendarmes.  Many a time these yells and groans would suddenly cease, and then a 
scuffle, whispering, and the sound like if they were carrying out a dead body or bodies.”126 
Haitians fled from the forced labor of the occupiers and quickly organized a resistance 
movement in the hill country.  The ensuing guerrilla war lasted three years and became infamous 
for its savagery.  NAACP secretary Herbert Seligman wrote of the violence in The Nation:  
“Haitians carrying a gun were for a time shot on sight. Machine guns have been turned on crowds 
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of unarmed natives, and United States marines have, by accounts which several of them gave me 
in casual conversation, not troubled to investigate how many were killed or wounded.”127  By his 
own admission, Smedley Butler and his marines hunted the cacos “like pigs.”128   
While the Marines were optimistic that the 1918 constitution would facilitate military 
control over the island, the caco rebellion in the hill country only intensified after its adoption.  
30,000 to 40,000 men joined the resistance movement of Dominican-born guerilla Charlemagne 
Perault in addition to the thousands of fighters already with Rosalvo Bobo.  Unable to defeat 
Perault on the battlefield, two Marines disguised themselves as Haitians and infiltrated his camp 
to kill him.  They took photographs of the caco leader’s body to drain morale among the 
resistance, but mistakenly propped up his body to resemble a dying Christ on the cross.  Months 
after his death, captured cacos, when asked about their commander, responded, “Mais, c’est 
Charlemagne.”  The Gendarmerie gave the caco leader five funerals and created five spurious 
grave sites to prevent his real resting place from becoming a pilgrimage site.  The assassination of 
Perault thus only emboldened the guerillas.129 
The cacos were untrained in tactics and armed with pitchforks, machetes, and pistols.  
Yet they were more than a match for the Gendarmerie.  The language barrier between the Marine 
commanders and the native gendarmes impeded communication and strategy on the battlefield.  
The Americans selected for positions in the Haitian officer corps were privates promoted beyond 
their level of competence and lacked advanced military training; the Americans had established 
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no officer training school for them.130  Native troops likewise were reluctant to wage war on 
behalf of a foreign power against their own countrymen.  But perhaps most damaging to the 
fighting ability of the Gendarmerie was the racial division between the soldiers and their 
commanders.  At the onset of the American occupation, Colonel William Waller warned his 
fellow Marines, “You can never trust a nigger with a gun.”  Because the Gendarmerie could not 
suppress the revolt, the Marine Corps themselves assumed control of the operation.  But the caco 
forces would not capitulate easily.  The superior firepower and air supremacy of the Marine 
Corps, combined with their frustration and violent prejudice against the natives, inevitably led to 
atrocities and war crimes.131 
 The Marines had difficulty distinguishing the “good” Haitians uninvolved with the armed 
rebellion from the cacos.  The Marines embarked on a policy of indiscriminate killing.  Marine 
Corps Commandant George Barnett testified before Congress about the courts martial of two 
Marines convicted of unlawful execution:  “Indiscriminate killing…the evidence in those two 
cases of Johnson and McQuilkin, particularly the statement of the counsel for the accused, who 
stated, in effect, that these men should not be punished for their acts, because they were following 
the general custom, and that he himself had seen many similar cases.”132   
 In October 1919, Colonel John H. Russell issued a confidential order decrying and 
forbidding the “open season” killings of Haitians by Marines.  The order tacitly acknowledges 
that, until 1919, “troops in the field have declared and carried on what is commonly known as an 
‘open season,’ where care is not taken to determine whether or not the natives encountered are 
bandits or ‘good citizens’ and where houses have been ruthlessly burned merely because they 
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were unoccupied and native property otherwise destroyed.”  The same day, Russell issued a 
proclamation to the Haitian people which did not mention the killings or apologize for them in 
any significant manner, and stated, “The occupation is determined to enforce only the laws of 
Haiti and have them respected, and it will assure its entire protection to all the good and 
peaceable citizens while it will drive out the bandits.”133  This Janus-like duplicity indicated the 
Marine Corps’ embarrassment and shame about their conduct during the guerrilla war but their 
dishonesty towards the Haitians citizens about it.  The Marines considered these war crimes an 
internal disciplinary manner and not fit for the Haitian peasantry to hear.
                                                            







HAITI IN THE 1920S 
The Senate Hearings, 1921 
 By the early 1920s, the Americans found themselves in an unenviable position in 
Haiti.  The prolonged guerrilla campaign precluded a planned withdrawal of American 
troops in 1919.  The Dartiguenave government extended the treaty of 1915 for twenty 
years, hoping to open the island to American capital investment and secure loans from 
American banks.  The Marines controlled the Haitian military and almost all levels of 
Haitian government, making smooth and expedient withdrawal impossible.  The Haitian 
government favored military occupation because it feared violent reprisals and a renewed 
revolutionary cycle, while the United States feared a hypothetical anti-American regime 
that would inevitably depose its client regime.  Because the threat of German influence 
over Haiti died with the end of the war in Europe, the occupation no longer served any 
strategic purpose.  Nevertheless, the United States held onto Haiti like a boy with his 
finger in a dike, unable to remove it for fear of the oncoming deluge.134 
                                                            




 The Occupation of Haiti became an important election-season issue in 1920.  The 
Senate had rejected the Treaty of Versailles and membership in the League of Nations, 
both major blows to Wilson’s legacy, and Republican candidate Warren G. Harding 
embarked on a campaign rejecting Wilsonian internationalism and foreign intervention in 
favor of isolationism, which he framed as a “return to normalcy.”   
In September 1920, Harding seized upon a gaffe by Democratic Vice-Presidential 
nominee Franklin Roosevelt in which he claimed he had written the Haitian constitution and that 
he had “something to do with the running of a couple of little republics.”  Additionally, he alleged 
that Roosevelt said that, until his resignation as Assistant Secretary, “I had two votes in the 
League [of Nations] Assembly, but now Secretary Daniels has them.”  Harding accused 
Roosevelt of his connection to the “rape of Haiti and Santo Domingo” and accused the Wilson 
administration of unconstitutional usurpation of power.  Harding said, “We are at war with our 
neighbors to the south through the usurpation by the Executive of powers scrupulously withheld 
by the Constitution.”135  Harding later apologized for his attacks, but the association of the 
Democratic Party with imperialism remained.136 
The Wilson administration swiftly prepared a rhetorical defense of its Haiti policy.  On 
October 5, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels made public a report by Major General John 
A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps since July, which glowingly defended the Marines 
in Haiti.  Lejeune praised the administration of Colonel Russell, whom he described as “an able, 
just, and humane officer.”  He described a September 6 speech given by President Dartiguenave 
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in which he praised the Marine Corps and begged their continued presence to combat the so-
called “bandit problem.”137 
The Lejeune Report was essentially a pre-emptive strike against the forthcoming Barnett 
Report.  In October 1920, Former Marine Corps Commandant George Barnett released a report 
concerning the first five-and-a-half years of the occupation and the counter-insurgency campaign, 
wherein he acknowledged the unlawful and indiscriminate killings of Haitian civilians.  The New 
York Times published abstracts from the report, along with Barnett’s attempts to downplay the 
severity of the “open season” policy.  Regardless, Barnett’s apologia was less fulsome than the 
administration would have liked. 
Of the total number killed during the five and a half years the marines have 
operated in Haiti, considerably more than half, in fact, 1,763, were killed in the repulse of 
the attack on Port-au-Prince and during the operations immediately following and made 
necessary by the attack[...]While the total number killed may seem large, it should be 
remembered that these operations extended over a period of five and a half years, and I 
believe without the operations by the marines a much larger number of natives would have 
been killed by the bandits during this time.138 
 When the polls closed on November 2, Harding and the Republicans cruised to an easy 
victory, signifying the electorate’s rejection of Wilsonian internationalism.  Public opinion in the 
United States had turned against the numerous interventions and military operations in Latin 
America.  The public viewed the expanded view of the Monroe Doctrine, which condoned 
imperialism, as an aberration. 
Buoyed by Harding’s wide margin of victory, the Republican Party entered 1921 with an 
expanded Senate majority, and used their electoral mandate to investigate the mistakes of the 
previous administration.  The Senate began by holding hearings on alleged war crimes in Haiti as 
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detailed in the Barnett Report.  The Senate committee heard testimony from members of the 
NAACP and the Union Patriotique d’Haiti, a Haitian-American organization opposed to the 
occupation.  In his opening testimony, Sténio Vincent, president of the Haitian Senate and future 
President of Haiti, accused the Wilson administration of conspiring against Haiti and the Haitian 
people.   
The truth is that the Wilson administration took advantage of the political 
adventures of a weak and defenseless nation and forced upon it an intervention 
which, through the agency of the American minister in Haiti in December, 1914, 
of the Fort Smith mission in March. 1915, and of the Paul Fuller, jr., mission in 
May, 1915, had been long in preparation...The Haitian people never asked 
American intervention. The conditions of the American occupation, as described 
in the Haitian memoir, have not been such as to cause the Haitian people to change 
their minds.139 
The Union Patriotique presented a memo to the Senate detailing the illegal 
actions of the Occupation regime.  It presented a list of twenty-five atrocities which the 
naval court already in place had not yet investigated, and stressed that “numberless 
abominable crimes have been committed.”  Specifically, the Marines burned houses, 
executed Haitians without trial, and kept prisoners in deplorable conditions, resulting in 
4,000 deaths in the prisons from 1918-1920.140  The memo demanded an end to martial 
law in Haiti, reorganization of the Gendarmerie to remove American officers, withdrawal 
of American forces from the island, abrogation of the 1915 treaty, and restoration of the 
National Assembly.141 
The United States Navy prepared its own memorandum on the Haitian 
Occupation to justify intervention in light of Haiti’s violent history.  The Navy memo 
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refers to Haiti as a land “afflicted with perpetual discontent and revolution.”  The Navy 
argued the violent climate which killed President Sam was not temporary, but an endemic 
aspect of Haitian political life.  The Navy describes,  
Visits [by American warships] in 1868, 1869. 1876, 1888, 1889, 1892, 
1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, and 1913. In these 
years the trouble and disturbances in Haiti was of such a serious nature that the 
Secretary of the Navy felt called upon to comment upon the fact that warships 
had been sent there. No doubt there were many times during this period that 
interior disturbances affected foreign interests without the restraining hands of 
the United States.142 
Furthermore, the Navy denied establishing a military occupation on the island, 
and insisted that the United States’ forces only supplemented and supported the native 
Haitian government.  This abstract legal fiction allowed the Navy to deny involvement in 
publicly-known abuses and scandals, such as forced labor in the corvée system and the 
massacres and tortures undertaken by the Marines.  Representatives of the Navy deflected 
blame for these atrocities to their Haitian subordinates.143  Likewise, the Navy excused 
the atrocities it committed against Haitians by insisting that the caco campaign was a 
different, more savage form of war, which justified savage conduct against the rebels. 
The enemy which our men had to meet and overcome were 
savages who operated free from all the restraints of civilized warfare. Not 
only did they give no quarter; they tortured with unspeakable tortures the 
prisoners they took […] For their acts, not exceeded in brutality by any 
other breed of savages at any time, they forfeited any claim to treatment 
such as should be accorded to those who abide by the rules of land warfare. 
It would have been justifiable to refuse every one of them quarter on 
surrendering and to ex terminate every last member of those bands. That 
this was not done is clear enough proof that there was no indiscriminate 
killing of natives who had taken the field against us.144 
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The chairman of the Senate committee, Medill McCormick of Illinois, opined 
that “We are there, and in my judgment we ought to stay there for twenty years.”145  The 
stories of torture and executions by the Marines failed to sway the public and the Senate, 
who despite their misgivings about the Wilson administration’s blunders agreed with the 
presence of the U.S. military on the island.  The final report of the McCormick 
Committee recommended that the United States abolish martial law and drastically 
reduce the number of American troops in Haiti.  To remedy the abuses of the 
gendarmerie, the committee called for a High Commissioner appointed by the State 
Department.  This would be a military office rather than a civilian one.  Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes selected John H. Russell for the position, and he was confirmed in 
1922 by Senate Resolution 249.146 
The High Commissioner 
General Russell did not view himself as head of a transitional administration, and 
considered the Haitians junior partners in the administration of their own country.  He 
said, “If the United States is to ride behind in its conduct of Haitian Affairs it had better 
withdraw entirely and let the country return to a condition of chaos when, after a time, the 
United States would be forced to again occupy Haiti or permit some foreign nation to do 
so.”147   
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Racial prejudice strongly informed Russell’s attitude toward the Haitian 
administration.  Russell did not view the Haitians as analogous to black Americans, but 
as a distinct race which nevertheless needed the influence and strong arm of the white 
man to achieve self-government.  Russell considered the average Haitian of the affranchi 
class as “an animal who will do whatever he is told,” and felt that the Haitians lived in a 
state of “savagery.”  While High Commissioner, he promised to engage the Haitian ruling 
class and “cultivate Haitian society regardless of color,” but the affranchis received him 
coldly.148 
Russell’s administration centralized authority into the office of High 
Commissioner to the detriment of the civilian government.  Russell’s stern hand and low 
view of Haitians meant that Haiti essentially became a military dictatorship.  Whatever 
authority the Dartiguenave client-government possessed before 1922 atrophied.  Russell 
demanded record of all correspondence between Haitian officials and the Gendarmerie, 
and insisted that the State Department refrain from contacting the American treaty 
officers directly.  He directly controlled all Haitian budgetary matters and vetoed any 
unsatisfactory legislation.  He likewise directly administered the Gendarmerie.149  The 
United States was reluctant to remove Americans from their positions in the 
Gendarmerie, which ultimately delayed full Haitian control of the armed forces until 
1929.150 
President Dartiguenave found this new onerous administration intolerable, and 
his protests to the United States led to his fall from power.  Dartiguenave knew he owed 
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his position to the Marine Corps and their rigged election, but he needed to appear 
patriotic to secure the support of the Haitian people, whom he feared would subject him 
to the same fate as Vilbrun Sam once the Marines steamed away from Port-au-Prince.  
His frequent protests caused occupation officials to disparage the president as an 
opportunistic agitator only marginally better than the cacos he opposed.  Russell 
described Dartiguenave as “anti-American, a man of no integrity, a schemer.”151  When 
the United States proposed to transfer the 1910 charter of the Banque Nationale to the 
National City Bank and consolidate Haiti’s foreign debt, he protested and refused to 
implement the changes.  Dartiguenave likewise proposed to return to Germans property 
sequestered in the 1915 invasion against the wishes of the United States.  In response, the 
financial adviser refused to pay the salaries of the president and his cabinet.152  
Dartiguenave attempted to seek a second term in the election of 1922, but the Americans 
prevented him from doing so.  His replacement, Louis Borno, was much more pliant to 
the demands of the High Commissioner.  Borno was immediately unpopular with the 
Haitian people from the beginning of his term, and his election was challenged as 
unconstitutional, because the State Council did not have the same authority as the defunct 
National Assembly to select the head of state, and that Borno himself was ineligible for 
the office since his father was French.  Nevertheless, the High Commissioner ignored 
these protests and allowed Borno to be seated.  The State Council elected Borno in April 
and he was seated in May.153 
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The United States assumed full responsibility of Haitian finances for the 
remainder of the decade.  Borno immediately passed the loan contract which 
Dartiguenave had refused and sold $16 million of bonds to American financial interests, 
backed by a general lien on Haitian revenues.  The loan was not granted, however, until a 
humiliating capitulation to the Occupation was achieved.  Haiti, as a point of national 
pride, had always paid its debts, however onerous, and among the Caribbean nations had 
the highest credit rating.154  The High Commissioner leaned heavily upon the Haitian 
Minister of Finance to authorize the loan, or foreign investment in Haiti would cease and 
American payments into the national budget would cease.  The loan was therefore 
another tether binding Haiti to the United States, preventing the Republic’s full 
independence.  The 1922 loan, although seemingly minor in its place in the pageant of 
Haitian history, marked a turn away from the republic’s financial self-reliance and toward 
dependence upon foreign aid, a state of affairs which persists to the present. 
After the loan, the United States took little interest in the occupation as long as 
the island kept quiet.  While the president and the State Department publicly expressed 
intention to withdraw American troops from Haiti.  In 1924, Secretary Hughes wrote that 
the United States would no longer intervene in Latin America and in 1928 wrote “we 
wish to leave as soon as we can do so with assurance that there will not be a recurrence of 
bloodshed.”  Calvin Coolidge promised repeatedly to withdraw from Haiti before the 
1936 treaty deadline, but took no positive action to do so.155 
Haiti during the 1920s was no more democratic than in 1915, despite the end of 
the guerrilla campaign.  President Borno served his term without a legislature and while 
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communal elections for mayors and city councils had been scheduled for 1926, 
Commissioner Russell nullified the results as “not altogether satisfactory” and directed 
the Haitian government to appoint communal commissions directly.156  The only times 
common Haitians voted during the occupation were the 1918 constitutional plebiscite and 
a plebiscite on constitutional amendments in 1928.  The Occupation closely monitored 
both votes to ensure a pro-American outcome.  A representative of the High 
Commissioner felt Haitians were “so ignorant that they would have no conception of the 
meaning of an election.”157 
The amendments to the constitution of 1918 were primarily proposed by 
President Borno, in 1927 and aimed to solidify his own grip on power.  The sixth and 
eighth amendments both lengthened the presidential term and provided for re-election of 
the president three times, and reduced the number of judges in the court system while 
making them appointed by the president.158  Secretary of State Frank Kellogg expressed 
severe reticence at the amendments, and wrote to Chargé d’Affaires Christian Gross that 
“The Department of State […] disapproves emphatically of amendment number 6, and is 
of the opinion that this proposed change in the Constitution is contrary to the principles 
of democratic government.”159  The reticence of the Secretary of State to approve of these 
amendments led to the elimination of the provision for immediate re-election, although 
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High Commissioner Russell intervened to allow the president the possibility of two 6-
year non-consecutive terms.160 
The correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State 
illustrates the power imbalance between the Haitian president and his American 
overseers.  Furthermore, it illustrates that the High Commissioner operated with little 
oversight save that given by the State Department, which during the 1920s operated 
largely in a hands-off fashion.  All political changes to Haiti came from High 
Commissioner Russell and were approved by the State Department.  The Haitian 
government had little say in the writing of their own constitution, and the Haitian people 
even less.  This arrangement concentrated political power in the person of the High 
Commissioner, and more broadly in the hands of the military.  Russell saw little need for 
a bureaucracy in administering the island, and even less in a democracy.  His approach to 
reforming the educational system illustrated this philosophy best.
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THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION 
 
 
The American authorities embarked on programs focused on “moral uplift” and 
material pragmatism.  The Americans hoped to make Haiti look like the United States by 
improving infrastructure.  By improving the body of the country, they hoped to heal its 
spirit, but in the process the Occupation abandoned pretense of national self-
determination and related principles.  In Commissioner Russell’s annual reports to the 
Secretary of State, he spent most of his ink discussing roads, telegraphs, hospitals and the 
gendarmerie while his discussion of education and elections was sparse.  His first report 
completely omitted any mention of the state of education in the Republic, and his second  
report only mentioned widespread illiteracy without offering any solutions, only “The 
erection of new schools must necessarily await an increase in the revenues of the 
country” and that “the energies of the Haitian Government at present should be directed 
along lines of agricultural development and training, and vocational instruction.”161 
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 When he toured the country in 1919, Samuel Inman remarked on the dilapidated 
schoolhouses and generally nonexistent state of higher education.  The treaty of 1916 had 
established U.S. control over almost all domestic improvements:  Americans could 
appoint officials to improve roads, sanitation, the postal service, hospitals, the 
gendarmerie, but nothing in the treaty concerned education.  In place of establishing 
educational institutions, the Occupation imported the superintendent of Louisiana’s 
public schools to oversee instruction.162   
Colonial Education in the American Empire 
 The poor quality of the segregated education provided to black pupils in 
Louisiana was not incidental in the Occupation’s decision.  Education throughout the 
American South was based on the “Atlanta compromise” forged between black 
educational leader Booker T. Washington and Southern white political leaders.  
According to the terms of this gentleman’s agreement, black Americans would submit to 
the Jim Crow system and cease petitioning for basic suffrage or protection from racist 
violence in exchange for a basic education in vocational or agricultural training.  
Washington summarized his reasoning for submission in his address to the 1895 Cotton 
States and International Exposition, “The agitation of questions of social equality is the 
extremest folly, and the progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to 
us must be the result of severe and constant struggle[...]The opportunity to earn a dollar 
in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an 
                                                            




opera-house.”163  The compromise left black Americans with second-class citizenship and 
added justification for the paternalism which informed the U.S. administrators of Haiti.   
 Lionel Burgeois, the Louisianan selected for the task of school reform, did not 
involve Haitians at any level of the planning process, and justified this exclusion with 
paternalism.  In a letter to Commissioner Russell, Bourgeois declared that the “peculiar 
psychology of the Haitian mass” was “unaccustomed to disciplining itself” and that “It is 
an incontrovertible fact that the Haitians are unfitted to the proper administration of the 
school system.”164  Thomas Snowden, the Military Governor of Santo Domingo (which 
the United States occupied concurrently with Haiti), who also served as a Military 
Representative of the United States to Haiti, likewise believed that only “civilized and 
educated white teachers” could improve the Haitian schools.165 
 Americans implemented in Haiti a similar system to those used in the Philippines 
and Puerto Rico.  When the United States first occupied the Philippines in 1898, it 
embarked upon similar programs of “moral uplift” and infrastructure improvement, with 
education based upon economic development, vocational training, and manual labor.  
However, by the 1920s, the U.S.-controlled Filipino government increased the portion of 
the budget devoted to education five times in ten years and expanded the curriculum to 
include liberal arts education, law, economics, and other disciplines conducive to 
bureaucratic and government work rather than manual labor.  Indeed, by 1928, American 
critics of the progressive educational policy implemented in the Philippines remarked that 
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“There are too many half-baked law students, bankers, and other white-collar job-hunters 
being turned out by the schools and colleges in the Philippines.”166  The school system 
implemented in the Philippines was designed to prepare the indigenous population for 
self-rule and gradually reduce their dependence upon the United States. 
 Similarly, the educational system of Puerto Rico initially focused upon 
vocational and agricultural instruction, but shifted to add a classical liberal-arts 
curriculum following the passage of the Jones Act of 1917, which granted U.S. 
citizenship to the island’s denizens.  Education was likewise conducted in English.  The 
Puerto Rican colonial education system was designed to assimilate the islanders rather 
than prepare them for self-rule, since Puerto Rico was a permanent fixture of the United 
States’ colonial empire rather than a temporary one like the Philippines.  Haiti, in 
contrast, was neither, and its status as the black republic led the High Commissioner to 
create an educational system both based on the perceived inferiority of the inhabitants 
and their inability to either assimilate or rule themselves. 
The Service Technique 
 First formed in 1923 upon the recommendation of the Senate Committee and 
implemented by Commissioner Russell through the Borno client-presidency, the 
Agricultural Extension and Teaching Service (hereafter the Service Technique) reformed 
Haitian education along American lines, replacing the system of civil education and 
religious schools already extant.  The Service Technique was under the purview of the 
Department of Agriculture, and its head was appointed by the Haitian President on the 
                                                            




nomination of the President of the United States, and Americans had general supervision 
of all schools within the Service.167   
 The schools of the Service Technique were the only ones built during the 
Occupation, and did little to alleviate the illiteracy problem.  In a report to President 
Herbert Hoover, Robert Russa Moton of the Tuskegee Institute estimated that the ratio of 
students to schools in northern Haiti was one to 1,759 and one to 3,317 in southern Haiti 
in 1930.  Moreover, only one-eighth of school-age children were enrolled in school at 
all.168  Service Technique schools reduced curriculum emphasis on liberal arts or literary 
studies and replaced them with vocational training, but were still woefully understaffed 
and unequipped to train a large volume of students. 
 In his annual reports to the Secretary of State, Commissioner Russell treated 
education as of secondary importance to agricultural and infrastructural development.  In 
his third report, he outlined his focus on vocational training by essentially dismissing 
higher education as unnecessary for Haiti’s largely-illiterate population.  “The Haitian 
Government […] is obviously desirous not to turn out from its schools many young men 
prepared solely for clerical and government work but to train the Haitians along 
economic and industrial lines.”169  In his fourth report, he derided the prior emphasis on 
liberal arts education.  “The members of the [educated] class do not know how to use 
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their hands and have no idea of the dignity of labor[...] It is among such a class that 
revolutions are bred.”170 
 The Service Technique was not entirely without its merits.  The schools included 
laboratory studies and other aspects of agricultural science, and in many rural areas of 
Haiti, were the only schools open.  The École Centrale in Port-au-Prince compiled 
invaluable data on soil and climate, forestry, cultivation of bananas, dairy and livestock 
ranching, and other forms of agriculture.  Nonetheless, the type of education promoted by 
the Service Technique was colonial in nature, administered by the Occupation for its 
financial betterment rather than the betterment of the Republic and its people.171 
 The Haitian people chafed at the sudden imposition of an “Anglo-Saxon” system 
of education based on the Jim Crow model.  In a rare dispute between the client-president 
and the High Commissioner, Louis Borno objected to the manner in which the 
Occupation had remodeled the pedagogical system.  In an address given during his 1926 
visit to the United States, the Haitian leader laid out his objections on cultural and 
ideological grounds, although couched them in conciliatory language: 
Sometimes there seems to be a tendency on the part of the United States 
to regard Latin America merely from the point of view of economic possibilities 
rather than from that of cultural stimulation.  Although making a living is an 
excellent and honorable objective, there is, in addition, life itself.  And Latin 
Americans possess a certain philosophy of life which […] will merit the study of 
the Anglo-Saxon.172 
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 Zonia Baber and Emily Greene Balch of the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom, a U.S.-based anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist advocacy 
group, described how the imposition of a foreign educational system upon Haiti 
threatened the national character of its people.  In Occupied Haiti, a collection of essays 
critical of the Occupation, they summarize Haitian feelings about the Service Technique 
thus, “Haitians so far as we talked with them, dread American influence on their 
educational system, fearing that if it is ‘Anglo-Saxonized’ it will be turned away from the 
French cultural tradition […] It is if their soul itself were in danger of being tampered 
with by alien hands.”173 
 The Occupation’s educational policy would have dire repercussions as the 1920s 
waned and the withdrawal deadline loomed.  The educational establishment, instead of 
reducing illiteracy and educating voters to prepare them for the democratic process, 
focused on training for menial agricultural work without schools for bureaucrats and 
civilian administrators, because military officials controlled civilian offices.  The 
Occupation prepared the political elite for subordinate administrative positions and did 
little for the peasantry, who were positioned to become landless and unemployed after 
withdrawal.  The Occupation prioritized material progress over political progress, and 
was poised to lose both.174
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 In the 1920s, the United States attempted to reformulate its policy toward the 
Latin American republics.  The Harding and Coolidge administrations did not reject the 
Monroe Doctrine entirely, but rejected the interventionism required by the Roosevelt 
Corollary.  The Republican administrations attempted to construct a new policy which 
allowed the United States to protect its national interests without resorting to foreign 
interventions.   
The Clark Memorandum 
 Charles Evans Hughes, who served as Secretary of State under Warren G. 
Harding and Calvin Coolidge from 1921-1925, completely rejected Wilsonian 
internationalism and the collective security arrangements of the League of Nations.  
During his time in the Senate, Hughes was a driving force in the isolationist camp which 
opposed the Treaty of Versailles and American membership in the League. 
 The lengthy Clark Memorandum, released in 1930 during the Hoover 
Administration, articulated the government’s new attitude.  J. Reuben Clark, 
undersecretary of State during the Coolidge Administration, prepared the 238-page memo 




interventions by foreign powers, and that the Roosevelt Corollary allowed it to become a 
sword of imperialism instead of a shield for the United States.  He decried the “grandiose 
schemes of national expansion” which invoked the Doctrine.175  Clark considered the 
Doctrine a self-preservation mechanism. 
 According to Clark, the Doctrine defines the relationship between the United 
States and Europe, not the United States and Latin America.  Therefore, the United States 
could only prevent intervention by European powers in Latin America.  The United 
States could not intervene itself, and the United States could not colonize, oppress, or 
victimize Latin American nations.  The Clark Memorandum removed the Roosevelt 
Corollary from the Monroe Doctrine entirely. 176  
 The Clark Memorandum was not the prime mover of United States foreign 
policy, but it did indicate a shifting trend in American foreign policy in the 1920s and 
1930s from progressive internationalism to conservative isolationism.  With the Clark 
Memorandum, the United States indicated its willingness to abandon interventionism.  
Foreign wars and interventions in Latin America never enjoyed popular support, and the 
Latin American interventions of the early twentieth century never accomplished their 
goals.177   
 The Clark Memorandum and indicated that the United States was ready to 
withdraw from Haiti and return control of the government to the Haitians, but no 
Republican administration assembled a formal exit policy.  The United States seemed 
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content to let American troops remain in Haiti until the 1936 deadline.  The 1932 election 
of Franklin Roosevelt led to a comprehensive Good Neighbor Policy which sought to 
cultivate positive relations and cultural exchange between the United States and Latin 
America.   
Haitian Unrest 
 The Occupation administration of Haiti made little effort to promote Haitians to 
high-level government positions as the 1936 treaty deadline approached.  High 
Commissioner Russell excluded Haitians from the government and alienated dissident 
American officials.  Russell’s administration considered Haitian ministers and Haitian 
ideas useless.  Financial adviser W.W. Cumberland said of Haitian financial ministers, 
“in my four years of experience in Haiti not a single [Haitian] Minister of Finance made 
one single constructive suggestion on any economic, commercial or financial subject.”178 
 President Borno remained subservient to the High Commissioner, and only 
exerted token displays of his executive authority when prompted to by his superiors.  In 
1927, Borno blocked Senator William H. King, a longtime critic of the Occupation, from 
visiting Haiti.  While the American press viewed this as an assertion of Haitian 
sovereignty, Financial Adviser Cumberland had orchestrated the move to improve the 
popular image of Borno’s government.  Russell permitted Borno to rule without a 
legislature and suppressed democratic elections, to the chagrin of the State Department.   
 The High Commissioner demonstrated his preference for legislation-by-bayonet 
when, in 1927, he requested 350 Marines who had left Haiti for Nicaragua to return in 
time for “constructive work contemplated for next winter, including, perhaps, the 
                                                            




modifying of the present constitution and drastic, but much-needed reforms in the 
judiciary system of Haiti.”179   Said reforms included further centralization of power and 
an extension of the presidential term from four years to six years, ensuring the client-
president’s continuance in office.  Laws regulating the freedom of the press and jury 
trials would originate from the Council of State, a legislative body appointed by President 
Borno himself.  The president appointed the legislature, which in turn elected the 
president, but every body of Haitian government followed the orders of the High 
Commissioner. 
 While the State Department initially prodded the Occupation to hold free 
elections in 1930, to ensure withdrawal of American troops by the 1936 deadline, 
department officials soon realized that Haitians would vote overwhelmingly against the 
Occupation-endorsed candidates.  Dana G. Munro of the Division of Latin American 
Affairs wrote,  
It is very doubtful, furthermore, whether an election held at present would 
have any appreciable value in training the Haitian people for self-government.  The 
masses of voters are still too ignorant and too much out of touch with the world.  
A continuance for a relatively short time of the development work now in progress, 
including the opening of roads and trails and the education of the peasants in the 
new rural schools, will work a great change in this respect.180 
 The people of Haiti grew restless and became enraged when the United States 
reneged on its promise to hold elections for the National Assembly.  The Occupation 
maintained a monopoly on radio broadcasting in Haiti, and by the late 1920s, the Haitian 
opposition had little political tools of expression except for heavily-censored newspapers.    
The worldwide economic depression which began in 1929 affected the island, and the 
                                                            





Occupation stifled foreign investment and development.  Amid this climate, the Haitian 
government imposed new taxes on coffee, and restricted migrant labor emigration to 
Cuba.181 
 1929 was a year of general unrest.  The first sparks of opposition were student 
strikes beginning in October.  Students from the Haitian Service Technique’s central 
agricultural college walked out of school in protest of scholarships which incentivized 
field work and a reduction of scholarships for students from the city.  High 
Commissioner Russell viewed the protests as a “petty students’ affair” seized by 
disgruntled opposition politicians to undermine the Haitian government.  Nevertheless, 
the protests spread across the country.   
 The students focused much of their ire on Dr. Freeman in his role as head of the 
Service Technique.  Students surrounded his house in Port-au-Prince and pelted it with 
rocks before being dispersed by the Garde with warning shots, while other protesters 
carried an effigy of the professor in the streets.  The colleges of applied sciences, 
medicine, and law joined the protest in solidarity and soon non-students and Haitian 
nationalists were voicing their disaffection in the streets of Port-au-Prince.  In Cap-
Haïtien a thousand protesters gathered around American outposts chanting, “Down with 
Freeman!” and “Down with Borno!”182 
 By early December, Russell decided to implement martial law and curfews in the 
cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien.  Non-Occupation-controlled press temporarily 
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ceased publication, but this did little to abate the growing unrest in the country.183  As the 
riots spread, the Occupation resorted to violence.  The protesters became so unruly that 
the Garde d’Haiti required American Marines to quell the riots. 184  On December 4, 
Russell invoked martial law and incorporated the Garde into the Marine Corps.  On 
December 6, 1,500 armed peasants marched on Cayes.  The marines ordered the crowd to 
halt, then opened fire on the protesters, killing ten.185 
 Commissioner Russell hastily attempted to downplay the significance of the 
massacre.  He continued to blame a nebulous body of agitators and unscrupulous 
politicians for the violence, and reached far to tie the massacre to Communist 
conspirators and rum-runners.  Russell remained clear about his message: the Occupation 
was innocent of any bloodshed, and the Cayes massacre proved that the Haitian people 
were not sober or rational enough for free elections; only martial law could restore 
peace.186 
 The Cayes massacre was an embarrassment to the Occupation and an outrage to 
the U.S. public, and was a major factor in the decision to end the Occupation and restore 
Haitian independence.  The massacre was also seminal moment in the development of 
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film journalism.  Newsreels in the United States presented moving images of the violence 
and brought the visceral reality of the carnage to the eyes of the viewers.187 
The Forbes Commission 
 Foreign newspapers lambasted American imperialism in Haiti, especially in light 
of the recently-signed Kellogg-Briand Pact, which purported to disavow warfare and 
other violent means to resolve disputes between nations.  The Manchester Guardian  
declared in December 1929, “Resentment against the American occupation has long been 
smoldering and needed only some minor dispute to cause it to burst into flame.”188  
Several Paris newspapers called for a League of Nations investigation into the 
Occupation.  The Journal des Débats remarked, “It is incontestable that the American 
occupation, which has lasted thirteen years, irritates the islanders, who realize that the 
independence of their country, which is a member of the League of Nations and a 
signatory of the Kellogg pact, has become fictitious.”189  Russian newspapers eagerly 
satirized the Occupation with cartoons of a belligerent Uncle Sam holding a gun to a 
Haitian’s head and captions mocking American imperialism and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact.190 
 President Hoover called for an inquiry into the conduct of the Marines, and the 
Americans at last appeared to exercise direct oversight over the Occupation.  In his 
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directive establishing the commission, Hoover declared “I have no desire for 
representation of the American government abroad by our military forces.”191  The head 
of the Commission, W. Cameron Forbes, had previously served as Governor-General of 
the Philippines and headed a presidential commission investigating conditions in the 
Philippines under the Harding administration.  Since the catalyst for the protests at Aux 
Cayes was the shoddy state of the Haitian education system, the commission included 
four senior faculty members of black universities in the United States, one of whom, R.R. 
Moton of the Tuskegee Institute, was appointed to head a second commission overseeing 
the Haitian educational system later in 1930.192 
 Forbes’s commission began its investigation in February 1930 with a primary 
goal of liquidating American responsibilities in Haiti and preparing the country for 
withdrawal of troops.193  He concerned the majority of his report with the state of Haitian 
infrastructure and education, for which he highly praised the Occupation, along with the 
constabulary, hospitals, and highways.194  Nevertheless, Forbes understood that the 
Occupation had failed in its mission to prepare the Haitian people for self-government.  
He tacitly acknowledged that the High Commissioner had treated Haiti as a colony.   
The acts and attitude of the Treaty officials gave your commission the 
impression that they had been based on the assumption that the Occupation would 
continue indefinitely.  In other words, their plans and projects did not seem to take 
into account that their work should be completed by 1936, and the commission 
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was disappointed to find that the preparation for the political and administrative 
training of Haitians for the responsibilities of government had been inadequate.195 
 During the deliberations of the commission, the Haitian people perceived 
themselves as being in a state of political limbo, and Louis Borno lost most of his 
remaining political support.  On the night of February 28, the Haitian Garde battled 
protesters in the streets of Port-au-Prince who feared that Borno was orchestrating a coup 
d’etat  by sacking six members of the Council of State.  When the commissioners arrived 
in Port-au-Prince, the same crowds called for a speedy end to Borno’s government and 
the withdrawal of the United States.  In his report, Forbes noted the conspicuous absence 
of any counter-protesters or public support of Borno’s government anywhere in the 
Republic.  He remarked, “It is fair to assume that public sentiment in Haiti was more 
responsive to the opposition than to the government.”196 
 Forbes determined that the method of selecting the Haitian president, indirect 
election by the Council of State, would not quell the riots and any successor to Borno 
selected in this manner would not enjoy public support.  The commission recommended 
the High Commissioner install a neutral president nominated by Borno and approved by 
Commissioner Russell, President Borno, and President Hoover.  Once this compromise 
candidate took office, the National Assembly would then hold elections for a permanent 
president.197   
 In his report, Forbes was largely resigned to the failure of the Occupation.  The 
Commission reported that it was “under no delusions” that once American troops 
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withdrew, chaos would resume in Haiti.  In private correspondence with Lord Irwin, the 
Lord viceroy of British India, he regarded the Haitians as unfit for self-rule, and wished 
for a benevolent dictator to take the reigns of government.198  Commissioner Russell, 
writing in his memoirs in 1934, justified his dictatorial control of the Haitian government 
by saying, “A military dictatorship for a country in which the foundations of democracy 
do not exist is not necessarily a bad thing.”199 
 R.R. Moton, who chaired a commission of black educators, issued his report in 
October of 1930, primarily aimed at the inadequacies of the Service Technique.  He 
considered the Service Technique to be woefully inadequate to the educational needs of 
the Haitian population, and recommended a “change of attitude” to reform the school 
system.200  None of Moton’s recommendations were implemented, as the energies of both 
the Haitian and American governments turned to the final settlement for withdrawal. 
 
Final Withdrawal 
 Eugene Roy, a private banker, assumed control of a provisional government in 
May 1930, and preparations promptly began for a legislative election in October.  The 
State Department, wary of vote-tampering and voter intimidation, ordered the Marines to 
stay in their barracks during polling.  This was the first free election in Haitian history, 
and resulted in the resounding defeat of every pro-American and pro-Occupation 
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candidate on the ballot.201  The National Assembly promptly elected opposition leader 
Sténio Vincent in November, and General Russell resigned as High Commissioner the 
same month.202   
 The election of Vincent initiated the last phase of the American administration:  
Haitianization.  Vincent had eloquently testified before Congress a decade earlier on 
behalf of the Union Patriotique d’Haiti concerning the abuses committed by the U.S. 
Marines, but he understood the necessity of stability during the transition between 
American and Haitian administrations.  The Haitian government removed Americans 
from political positions and replaced them with Haitians, with the notable exception of 
the Haitian military.  In October 1931, Haitianization of the Garde began, and completed 
in December 1934.  The United States imposed strict fiscal policies as conditions for full 
withdrawal of troops, and retained a fiscal representative to observe the Haitian payment 
of loans to the United States.  Restoration of Haitian independence would occur gradually 
and with American supervision.  Haiti would be free on American terms.203 
 Herbert Hoover lost the U.S. presidency in 1932 to Franklin Roosevelt.  Despite 
his involvement with the Wilson-era Occupation, Roosevelt was eager to reduce 
American military presence in the Caribbean.  The new president committed himself to a 
Good Neighbor Policy and warmer relations with Latin American republics, but 
pragmatic financial concerns likewise informed his commitment to troop withdrawal. 
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 The Vincent government reluctantly agreed to continued financial of the Banque 
Nationale in 1932 and used this concession to secure another foreign development loan, 
although the Haitian legislature balked at both proposals, viewing both American control 
of the Banque and another loan as undermining Haitian independence.  Both Vincent and 
Roosevelt bypassed the Haitian legislature and reached an Executive Accord in August 
1933, wherein American control of all Haitian financial institutions would remain in 
exchange for troop withdrawal two years before the treaty deadline of 1936.  In this way, 
Roosevelt benefited from appearing benevolent while still maintaining a sphere of 
influence over Haiti.  Haiti would not regain control of its finances until 1941.204
                                                            








In the years following the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Haiti reverted to its revolutionary 
cycle.  The campaign to crush the caco rebellion did little to bring peace or stability to the 
country.  The violence inflicted by the Marines upon the Haitians reflected the pervasive racism 
of their home country and undermined the efforts of the Occupation government to reconstruct 
the island nation.205 
Upon leaving office, High Commissioner Russell presciently remarked that Haiti would 
soon revert to military dictatorships, but that they would not be “as cynical, cruel, and reactionary 
as the past.”206  While Russell meant to minimize the failures of his own administration with the 
remark, he belied the democratic nation-building goals of the United States.  The paternalistic 
racism and anti-democratic policies of the Occupation inhibited chances for Haitian self-rule and 
independence.  A country accustomed to autocratic rule will revert to authoritarianism to restore 
stability in the absence of any other alternatives, and the violent and incompetent Occupation 
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provided no such alternative.  The United States Occupation actually interrupted a trend toward 
peasant enfranchisement and power-sharing between the elite and the peasantry.  Before the two 
client-presidents, Dartiguenave and Borno, eleven of the twelve preceding Presidents of Haiti had 
been from the peasant underclass.207  The brief attempt at a mission civilisatrice by the United 
States utterly failed to instill liberal democracy by restoring the ruling class to political power and 
preventing the Haitians from electing their own legislature and president. 
While American administration of Haiti and the presence of U.S. troops ended in 1934, 
Haiti did not regain control of its finances until 1941, and still remains dependent upon foreign 
aid to prop up its own economy.  U.S. investors expected large profits from the Haitian building 
projects, which never materialized.  The technocratic impulse of the United States to build and 
improve infrastructure relied upon American capital.  Once the occupation ended, this stream of 
capital dried up, and Haiti had few natural resources or domestic capital.  The public works 
system of bridges, railways, and canals fell into decay under corrupt and inefficient governments.  
The swelling population in post-occupation Haiti proved too great a burden for the health 
system.208  The regimen of foreign aid which began in 1922 did not allow foreign investors return 
on their capital, and led to domestic industries to atrophy, creating dependency upon foreign 
investment and aid which continues to the present. 
The Gendarmerie staffed and trained by the occupation proved the most durable and 
lasting legacy of U.S. rule.  The Garde d’Haiti became the new ruling class, and political 
authority became centralized in Port-au-Prince.  This allowed autocratic dictators to gain and o 
keep power with ease.  Under U.S. rule, the Garde shifted from province to province to break the 
will of the resistance fighters as well as local political organizations.  Post-occupation Haiti was a 
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fertile ground for strong-man governments.  The first post-Occupation president, Sténio Vincent, 
immediately amended the constitution to allow himself an extended term without a democratic 
election.  This penchant for dictatorship continued in Haiti for another half-century.209  The U.S. 
Occupation enabled Haitian nationalism by breaking the oligarchy of the ruling class, allowing 
the previously-disfranchised africains to assume political power.  While this social development 
could have aided a liberal democracy, it only strengthened dictatorships in Haiti. 
The post-Occupation dictatorships grew organically from Haiti’s political culture because 
they were reinforced by the imperial culture of the Occupation.  The client-presidents controlled 
relatively little of their own country, subservient in almost all respect to the High Commissioner.  
The “tutelage” program of the Occupation did not allow for free elections or participation by 
average Haitians in the legislative process.  This form of top-down white rule was directly 
imported to Haiti from the American South, where the white ruling class lived in fear of black 
citizens exercising their right to suffrage, and “colored rule” became a punchline in the cartoons 
of Thomas Nast. 
Conversely, the interactions between African-Americans and Haitians strengthened the 
Haitian’s self-conception and led to Haitian nationalism based on Pan-Africanism.  Haitians of 
the africain class, frequently unable to find employment in Haiti, migrated elsewhere in the 
Caribbean or to the continental United States.  There, they came in contact with the NAACP and 
the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which both publically condemned the 
Occupation and sought to liberate Haiti by turning American public opinion against the 
Occupation.210  Additionally, the racism and brutal suppression of the caco rebels led the 
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affranchis to reject the Francophilia of their ancestors.  Francois Duvalier, dictator of Haiti from 
1957-1971, adopted a négritude philosophy which emphasized pan-Africanism and vodoun.211.   
The educational system imposed from above by the United States, which had led to the 
riots precipitating the Cayes Massacre, did not long survive the Occupation.  With the 
dismantling of the Service Technique even before the final withdrawal in 1934, Haitians 
attempted to create a replacement school system, but funding always came up woefully short in 
the post-Occupation administrations.  Today, Haiti has the lowest literacy rate among Latin 
American countries at 61 percent.212 
The Haitian intervention experiment would provide lessons to the United States about 
fighting small-scale guerrilla campaigns and about nation-building.  The Occupation far outlasted 
its popularity and did not leave behind a stable government or a democratic society.  Because of 
this, the United States coordinated state-building with native governments and allies in occupied 
countries following World War II.  The Cold War and the spread of Communism to the Western 
Hemisphere led the United States to resume direct interventions in Latin America to preserve its 
regional hegemony, but these interventions occurred either covertly or with support of U.S.-
friendly interests in the affected countries.  The United States only softened its touch with Latin 
America once it secured its hegemony over the Americas once again after the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991.  The United States in the early twenty-first century attempted to establish a 
similar hegemony over the Middle East, and intervened directly in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 
in 2003.  Both invasions preceded long and costly guerrilla campaigns which did little to support 
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either democracy or regional stability.  In its continuing pursuit of foreign adventurism, the 
United States forgot the lessons of Haiti. 
Democracy remains an elusive goal for modern-day Haiti.  In the wake of the Duvalier 
dictatorships, Haitians drafted a constitution in 1987 which provided for direct election of the 
president and prohibited him from serving consecutive terms.  Haiti held its first truly democratic 
election in December 1990, which resulted in a victory for former Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide.  The Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a coup d’etat in September 1991, but he 
returned to power after the United States’ 1994 intervention, Operation Uphold Democracy.  
Aristide peacefully ceded power to René Préval in 1996, marking the first democratic transition 
of governments since Haitian independence almost two centuries prior.  Aristide won a second 
term in 2000, but another coup toppled him in 2004, and American, French, and Canadian forces 
escorted the deposed president to exile in Africa despite his protests.  The devastating earthquake 
of January 2010 indebted Haiti to foreign aid, mostly from the United States.   
Haiti in the twenty-first century was firmly within the American sphere of influence.  The 
dependence upon foreign aid was first engendered during the Occupation, with the loan of 1922 
which the United States strong-armed the client-president into accepting.  The economy of Haiti 
became increasingly tied to foreign investments, until that money dried up following the 
withdrawal of American troops.  Today, Haiti must go hat-in-hand to the United States to 
alleviate its most pressing financial needs.   
According to a 2012 Gallup poll, 79 percent of Haitians approved of American world 
leadership and generally held high opinions of the United States and its people.213  The United 
States remained the nation’s largest trading partner and large amounts of American money and 
                                                            





manpower poured into the country after 2010.  Haitian expatriates in the United States number 
around two million, and according to a 2005-6 poll, 67 percent of Haitians would emigrate to the 
United States if they could.  Four-fifths of college-educated Haitians live in the United States.214  
The United States, due to its close diplomatic and geographic ties with the island, still views the 
well-being of Haiti as its responsibility.  Foreign aid offered to Haiti often comes with provisos 
and conditions which indicate that the United States only offers aid to Haiti in accordance with its 
own interests rather than the interests of Haiti.215 
The U.S. experiment in Haiti failed to create a functional state independent of U.S. aid or 
control.  The United States made an ineffectual and half-hearted effort to change the status quo of 
perpetual political violence, poverty, and dependency upon foreign aid and financial interests.  
The endemic racism of U.S. society prevented the U.S. from affording Haitians any measure of 
real independence and self-rule.  The undemocratic practices at home prevented free and fair 
elections, and the lasting legacies of the occupation were more authoritarian governments and 
more hunger and abuse for the people of Haiti.  The United States failed Haitians because of its 
own prejudices. 
 In his 1921 testimony before Congress concerning the caco campaign, Smedley 
Butler remarked, “We were all embued [sic] with the fact that we were the trustees of a huge 
estate that belonged to minors.  That was the viewpoint I personally took…that we were 
endeavoring to make for them a rich and productive property, to be turned over to them at such a 
time as our government saw fit.”216  If Butler spoke the truth, then the United States treated its 
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wards not as heirs but as illegitimate children, barely acknowledged and abused.  They limped 
along the century sickly as they became ever more dependent upon their guardians for 
sustenance.  A century after the Marines took Port-au-Prince, the shackles of civilization still bind 
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